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A SKETCH OF THE CONSEQUENCES FOR LOUISIANA
LAW OF THE ADOPTION OF "ARTICLE 2: SALES"
OF THE UNIFORM> COMMERCIAL CODE*
JERRY L. JY"lASHAwt
The Uniform Commercial Code is presently under study by the
Louisiana Law Institute. This article is a partial synopsis of a
more detailed report that the author prepared for the Institute. It
has the limited purpose of introducing the Louisiana Bar to a few
of the concepts and innovations of the UCC in comparison with the
existing principles of the Louisiana law of sales. However, the
reader is requested to excuse, in an avowedly "sketchy" treatment,
an occasional lapse into hypertechnical discussion. One of the in-
evitable difficulties in comparing sets of legal principles is to decide
with any degree of certainty what either or both might mean stand-
ing alone.
1. THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE TWO
Article 2 of the UCC can be adopted with only minor amend-
ments to the Civil Code. Most of the general provisions of the Code
on conventional obligations would remain applicable in respect of
transactions subject to the UCC,! and the existing law of sale would
yet apply to sales of immovables. The effect of the adoption of
article 2 would simply be to remove questions of sales of movables
from the "sales law" scheme of the Civil Code. This removal would
be virtually complete. Article 2 is in no sense a special law for
"commercial" sales or for "merchants." The concept of "merchant"
has some importance in the UCC, but its effect is merely to bring
into play certain special standards of care and skill in specific in-
stances.2 All sales of goods are meant to be covered.
* All Uniform Commercial Code citations are to the 1962 Official Text; the
Uniform Commercial Code is hereinafter cited as UCC.
. t Assistant Professor of Law, Tulane University.
1 UCC § 2-103 provides:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles
of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or in-
validating cause shall supplement its provisions.
2 UCC § 2-204(1) provides:
(1) Merchant means a person who deals in goods of the kind or
otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or
skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to
whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of
an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds
himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
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A. Sale
As might be expected "sale" covers something more than its
definition in the Dee, "the passing of title from the seller to the
buyer for a price."3 As in Louisiana4 "contracts to sell" or sales of
future goods are also covered.5 No attempt is made to set forth a
rule for distinguishing sales from other transactions, such as, ser-
vice contracts,6 leases7 or partnerships.s Such determinations are
left to pre-existing law.9
The article 2 provisions would also apply to exchanges of goods
and to that portion of a transaction involving goods where the
exchange is of movables for immovables.10 This application of sales
law to exchanges is substantially in accordance with the present
Louisiana position,!l and would result only in the elimination of any
distinction between the remedies available for breach of warranty
of title in sale12 and exchange transactions.13
B. Goods
The definition of "goods" in the Dee could cause some confusion
in Louisiana unless the purpose of the definition is kept clearly in
view. The difficulties arise in respect of goods attached to realty,
that is, common law "fixtures" or our immovables by destination14
and occasionally by nature.15 Should the Dee, if adopted, govern
the sale separate from land of a structure attached to it, of growing
crops, of uncut timber, of minerals or machinery in place; or would
such transactions be subject to the pre-existing law of sales in re-
spect of immovables? The solution, a not too happily drafted one,
is found in Dee § 2-107:
3 UCC § 2-106 (1).
4 See Plaquemines Equipment & Mach. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 245 La. 201,
157 So: 2d 884 (1963).
5 UCC § 2-106.
6 See Papa v. Louisiana Metal Awning Co., 131 So. 2d 114 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1961).
. 7 See General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Pine Tree Amusement Co., 180 La.
529, 156 So. 812 (1934).
S See Kennedy v. Perry Tinlber Co., 219 La. 264, 52 So. 2d 847 (1951).
9 See Epstein v. Giannattasio, 197 A.2d 342 (Conn. 1963) (service con-
tract).
10 UCC § 2-304(1) and (2).
11 La. Civil Code arts. 2660-67 (1870).
1-2 La. Civil Code art. 2506 (1870).
13 La. Civil Code art. 2663 (1870).
Dation en paiment would also be covered where movables were given, and
the treatment of dation as a "delivery" contract for purposes of risk of loss
would continue under the scheme of UCC §§ 2-509 and 2-510.
14 La. Civil Code art. 468 (1870).
15 La. Civil Code art. 467 (1870).
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Goods to Be Severed From Realty: Recording.
(1) A contract for the sale of timber, minerals or the
like or a structure or its materials to be removed from realty
is a contract for the sale of goods within this Article if they
are to be severed by the seller but until severance a pur-
ported present sale thereof which is not effective as a trans-
fer of an interest in land is effective only as a contract to sell.
(2) A contract for the sale apart from the land of grow-
ing crops or other things attached to realty and capable of
severance without material harm thereto but not described
in subsection (1) is a contract for the sale of goods within
this Article whether the subject matter is to be severed by
the buyer or by the seller even though it forms part of the
realty at the time of contracting, and the p:;trties can by
identification effect a present sale before severance.
(3) The provisions of this section are subject to any
third party rights provided by the law relating to realty
records, and the contract for sale may be executed and re-
corded as a document transferring an interest in land and
shall then constitute notice to third parties of the buyer's
rights under the contract for sale.
The basic idea here is fairlY clear. The subsection (1) items are
considered so intimately connected with realty that they will be
treated as subject to legal rules governing the sale of goods only
where the buyer is not given a right against the land to accomplish
their severance from it. Subsection (2) things, on the other hand,
are viewed primarily as moving in trade and as not partaking of
those attributes of immovables which result in special legal treat-
ment for transactions involving real rights.
Obviously section 2-107(1) would result in some change in
present movable/immovable classifications for sale purposes. A
sale of standing timber/6 of minerals in place17 or of a structure on
land18 would under existing law be considered the transmission of
an interest in l'eal property. Arguably a sale of timber19 or miner-
als20 with severance by the seller could be considered a "contract to
sell" goods in Louisiana, but certainly the sale of a building would
be considered in all cases the sale of an immovable.
The effect of such a reclassification, abstractly considered, is to
allow oral21 sales of buildings, minerals and timber, to make the
16 La. R.S. 9:1103 (1950).
17 Long-Bell Petroleum Co. v. Tritico, 216 La. 426, 454, 43 So. 2d 782, 791
(1949) •
18 La. Civil Code art. 464 (1870),
19 La. Civil Code art. 465 (1870).
20 Such an interpretation would avoid giving real rights such as have
resulted in the classification of sales of minerals in place as predial servitudes
in Louisiana.
21 La. Civil Code art. 2277 (1870).
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concept of lesion22 inapplicable to their transfer and to eliminate
preferential access to specific performance23 in respect of such
transactions. However, what the real effects of such a change would
be cannot be assessed without an appreciation of the DCC's formal-
ity requirements,24 the extent to which situations involving lesion
may be covered by the DCC concept of "unconscionability,"25 and
the criteria for specific performance under DeC § 2-716.26 This
article will not cover all these issues; suffice it to say that little dif-
ference in practical effect is to be expected.
The effect of section 2-107 (2) is more difficult to assess. At most
the provision on growing crops will add an additional instance in
which crops are de-immobilized by anticipation.27 The provision on
articles severable without "material harm" has an echo in the
Louisiana test for the identification of immovables by distinction
under articles 468-69-a test that has also been made applicable to
article 467 immovables by nature in the context of a determination
of the continued existence of a vendor's privilege.28 In fact apart
from the vendor's privilege cases the question of the mobility or im-
mobility of "fixtures" has arisen almost exclusively in the context of
a dispute over what is covered by a sale of real property or a real
mortgage. The DCC provisions on sale of goods do not purport to
cover these questions.29
The section 2-107 (2) classification would, like that in section
2-107 (1), only affect issues which are strictly related to the law of
sales, such as, the requirement of a writing, the applicability of
lesion on the availability of specific performance. The question of
whether a separate sale of property which would be classified as
immovable under articles 467-69 of the Civil Code presently works
an immediate anticipatory de-immobilization as contemplated in
DCC § 2-107 (2) has apparently never arisen in Louisiana in a
situation presenting any of these issues. Query why items consid-
ered immovable under those much-litigated articles should in rela-
tion to their sale receive special treatment in terms of formalities,
hard bargains or remedies.
22 La. Civil Code art. 2589 (1870).
23 La. Civil Code art. 2462 (1870).
24 UCC § 2-201. Note also that third party rights will not be affected with-
out recordation under existing law as continued by UCC § 2-107 (3), and thus a
writing should remain customary in such sales.
25 UCC § 2-302. See Comment, 42 Tul. L. Rev. 193 (1967).
26 See discussion infra at notes 159 and 170 and accompanying text.
27 See discussion in A. Yiannopoulos, Civil Law Property 133-37 (1966);
Citizen's Bank v. Witz, 31 La. Ann. 244, 246 (1879).
28 Cottonport Bank v. Dunn, 21 So. 2d 525 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945).
29 That property is expected to be classified differently for different pur-
poses is indicated, for example, by the adoption of a different definition of goods
in the secured transactions article of the UCC. See UCC § 9-105.
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II. FORMATION OF SALES CONTRACTS
A. Consent
Broad in scope the UCC is also occasionally radical in design,
at least when compared with our Civil Code provisions. This should
be expected. The Civil Code was drafted in an era in which political
liberalism and laissez-faire economics had as their counterpart in
the private law of contract an emphasis on the exercise of the
individual will. This general idea, that no obligation is incurred
until two wills freely exercised are united on a single point, lies at
the base of our Civil Code provisions which require the attainment
of a high degree of certainty of obligation before a contract is per-
fected.
The UCC approach is markedly different. It is after all a twenti-
eth century document influenced by the concern in all branches of
learning with patterns of group behavior. Although largely de-
signed to solve specific problems arising under the common law and
Uniform Sales Act, the UCC provisions on offer and acceptance
exhibit a reasonably dear policy. It is a policy which favors the
upholding of a general commercial expectation that "the deal is
on" where circumstances warrant that expectation and, if neces-
sary, in the face of particular, verbalized demands or expectations
which indicate a lack of complete agreement. A couple of examples
are in order.
1. Open term contracts
Section 2-204 (3) of the UCC provides:
Even though one or more terms are left open a contract
for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have in-
tended to make a contract and these is a reasonably certain
basis for giving an appropriate remedy.
The language of this subsection does not specify what terms may be
left open, but sections 2-305 and 2-306 clearly indicate that agree-
ment on price or quantity or both may be omitted without neces-
sarily preventing the formation of a sales contract.
The Price Term
In Louisiana there must be agreement on the price,30 or at least
submission of its determination to an impartial arbitrator,Sl in
order to perfect a contract of sale. The necessity for certainty of
price is apparently a particular application of the Civil Code's
so La. Civil Code arts. 1764, 2439, 2464 (1870).
31 La. Civi}. Code art. 2465 (1870).
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general theory of potestative conditions-there is no contract
where one or both of the parties have not bound themselves as to
the essential stipulations of the agreement.
However, the courts dealing with certainty of price have not
always kept this policy basis in view. They have denied validity to
sales where the price was ascertainable by a prescribed method32
and where ascertainment would not have depended on the will of
one of the parties.33 These cases should be ignored in favor of later
cases34 which admit that that which may be made certain is certain
for purposes of the law, at least in situations where there is little or
no danger that the price can or will be manipulated by one party to
the disadvantage of the other. Thus, for example, it should be pos-
sible under present law to make a sale at the "market price" on a
future date, provided it is sufficiently clear what "market" is in-
tended, how that price is to be determined, and by whom.35
Even given the more liberal approach of recent jurisprudence,
the Louisiana law does not contemplate the existence of a sale
where the price is "open" in the sense of DCC § 2-305, which pro-
vides:
(1) The parties if they so intend can conclude a con-
tract for sale even though the price is not settled. In such a
case the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery if
(a) nothing is said as to price; or
(b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they
fail to agree; or
(c) the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed mar-
ket or other standard as set or recorded by a third
person or agency and it is not so set or recorded.
(2) A price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer
means a price for him to fix in good faith.
(3) When a price left to be fixed otherwise than by
agreement of the parties fails to be fixed through fault of one
party the other may at his option treat the contract as can-
celled or himself fix a reasonable price.
(4) Where, however, the parties intend not to be bound
unless the price be fixed or agreed and it is not fixed or
agreed there is no contract. In such a case the buyer must
return any goods already received or if unable so to do must
pay their reasonable value at the time of delivery and the
seller must return any portion of the price paid on account.
32 E.g., Clark v. Comford, 45 La. Ann. 502, 12 So. 763 (1893).
33 E.g., Wise v. Guthrie, 11 La. Ann. 91 (1856).
34 E.g., Brown v. Shreveport, 15 So. 2d 234 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1943).
35 See Princeville Canning Co. v. Hamilton, 159 So. 2d 14 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1963) (enforcement denied for lack of above-mentioned elements).
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This article seems to presume in accordance with the better rea-
soned Louisiana decisions that there is no problem in respect of
contracts where the only uncertainty is the reduction of unliqui-
dated amounts to absolutely certain sums. It goes on from there to
allow enforcement of contracts for sale where no price has been
agreed upon and/or the method for determination has failed.
Nothing said about price. The provision for finding a reasonable
price where nothing has been said as to price seems to be directed
at situations in which the parties are dealing on the basis of tag or
catalogue prices which are known to both of them or where a buyer,
relying upon past experience that the price will be competitive,
places an order with his traditional supplier for goods whose price
he does not know. In other words, the situations covered by section
2-305 (1) (a) appear to be those in which a course of dealing or
commercial practice has been relied upon and in which a finding
that there was no contract would clearly be at variance with the
parties' expectations. Unless these commercial expectations were
present, a court would not be justified in finding, in the absence of
some stipulation as to price, that there was the necessary intent to
conclude a contract for sale within the meaning of section 2-305 (1).
There is some question whether this provision would make any
change in the Louisiana law. If there is a price but it is simply not
stated in a written contract, article 1900 of the Civil Code would
allow a showing of an agreed price. Such a showing might involve
proof that goods were normally billed at tag or catalogue price and
that the parties operated on this assumption. If the goods have
been delivered and accepted by the buyer there is no great problem
concerning whether there is or is not a contract. If there is a con-
tract the seller is entitled to the price, if not, he is entitled to the
value of the goods in quasi-contract. Whether the court implies a
"reasonable" price or establishes a "fair value" should be of little
moment.S6
For this reason it is virtually impossible to determine whether
Louisiana courts dealing with situations where there has been no
mention of price are thinking in terms of a contract, with an im-
plication of assent from conduct and a judicially supplied "price,"
or of a quasi-contractual obligation to pay the value of received
goods.37 The language of article 1816 of the Civil Code seems to be
applicable to an open price situation: "To receive goods from a
merchant without any express promise and to use them, implies a
36 See Charles Wemar Co. v. Pokorny & Son, Ltd., 7 La. App. 562, 565
(1928). Of course, if "special damages" were involved, the distinction between
contract and quasi-contract would make a difference.
37 See, e.g., Myers Implement Co. v. Deboer, 9 So. 2d 832 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1942).
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contract to pay the value." Moreover, this article is one containing
examples of implied assent in the formation of contracts. Yet, the
article speaks of "value," and it has occasionally been held to refer
to a quasi-contractual obligation.38
H. T. Cotton Co. v. Moises,39 seems the strongest Louisiana
authority for the proposition that the court may supply the price in
an open price contract. There the vendee refused to accept the
goods; hence, no "use" giving rise to a quasi-contract was involved.
The court found that the billing price was the fair market value
of the goods and allowed the vendor to recover the difference be-
tween the market (billing) price and the resale price. This result
would certainly follow from uee § 2-305(1) (a) and from uee
§ 2-204 (3), which requires only that the court find a "reasonably
certain basis" for giving an appropriate remedy.
The converse and more difficult problem of the buyer's ability
to collect damages for non-delivery where the price was open be-
cause nothing had been said about it has apparently not been liti-
gated in Louisiana.
P1'ice left to ag1'eement. Where the price is left to be agreed
upon by the parties at a later time, the Louisiana position would
clearly be that there is no sale until such agreement is reached, If
there is no agreement, there is no sale. Under uee § 2-305 (1) (b),
however, a reasonable price might be supplied, if the court finds an
intent to contract. Where the agreement specifically leaves the price
to future agreement alone it would seem difficult for a court to find
an intent to be bound absent that agreement. Nor would there be a
"reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy," other
than restitution or quasi-contractual relief as provided in section
2-305(4). In such situations section 2-305(1) (b) might have no
practical effect on Louisiana law.
On the other hand, where there is some indication of a standard
which limits the possibilities of future agreement, the uee ap-
proach might yield different results. Should the contract provide
that the price is to be agreed upon subject to a maximum price
(e.g., highest price charged other large customers), the court might
find a reasonably certain minimum of damages due a buyer who has
been forced to "cover" in a rising market.40 The provision of a
minimum-remedy rule where the exact terms of agreement are in-
38 E.g., Duggan Mach. Co. v. Consolidated Well Servo Co., 187 So. 2d 124
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
39 149 La. 305, 88 So. 916 (1921).
40 See discussion of Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n V. Remington Paper Co.,
235 N.Y. 338, 139 N.E. 470 (1923) in 1 Report of the New York Law Revision
Commission on the Uniform Commercial Code 278 (1955) [hereinafter cited as
N.Y. Rep.].
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definite, but where it is commercially certain that the parties in-
tended to be bound, seems to be the primary thrust of section
2-204 (3). It is very doubtful that a court is meant to do any more
than this under section 2-305(1) (b), for subsection (3) of that
section makes it clear that failure to agree through the fault of one
party does not give the other party the right to consider the condi-
tion as fulfilled.
In terms of economic effect this result does not seem objection-
able. Agreement on price fixes the risks of the parties in respect of
rise and fall in the market. If they are unwilling to accept these
risks absolutely, but provide a partial allocation by reference to a
limitation on the possibilities for subsequent agreement, there
seems no reason why this partial allocation of risks should not be
given effect through a remedy based on the contract.
Failure of external standa1·d. A reasonable price may also be
supplied under the Commercial Code if an external standard fails
to materialize or an arbitrator fails to fix the price. This is directly
contrary to Louisiana Civil Code article 2465. The UCC provision
is probably the better rule. That provision is of course qualified by
the intent criterion of section 2-305 (4) and thus relies on the trier
of fact to determine whether the particular external indicator was
an essential condition of the contract. If not, a substitute may be
supplied. Article 2465 of the Civil Code excludes the possibility of
fulfillment of the condition by an equivalent act, thus presuming
that the particular person (or market, etc.) is absolutely necessal"Y
to the fulfillment of the condition in the contemplation of the
parties. This strict view of the fulfillment of conditions is not found
in the general article on the performance of conditions, article 2037.
Price left to one party. There can be little doubt that Louisiana
law would not give effect to a purported sale which left the price to
the decision of one of the parties. Article 2464 clearly states that
the parties must fix the price, and the rationale for the certain-
price rule is virtually unanimously found in preventing the depen-
dency of the price on the will of one of the parties.41 UCC § 2-305
(2), on the contra1"Y, presumes that the price may be left to one of
the parties and imposes on that party an obligation of good faith in
fixing the price.
There seems nothing objectionable in this change. Article 2464
should not really be considered as describing a requirement based
41 M. Planiol & G. Ripert, 10 Traite Pratique de Droit Civil Fran~ais 36-7
(2d ed. 1956) suggest that there is in such cases an obligation on the vendor
to accept the price set and that when it is set there is a sale. However, there
is apparently no support for this proposition in the jurisprudence under
Article 1591 of the French Civil Code, the equivalent of article 2464 of the
Louisiana Civil Code.
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on the theory of potestative conditions. To leave the price to one of
the parties is not to predicate the existence of his obligation on a
purely potestative condition any more than is the suspension of the
perfection of a contract until one party has the view and trial of
the object. If the latter is an acceptable suspensive condition,42
there seems no l"eaSOn why the Civil Code should prohibit the
former. "Good faith" can form as effective a check on abuse of the
power to fix the price, as on the power to accept or reject after trial.
Of course there are greater difficulties in the price situation in
determining what remedy to apply should the party having the
power to set the price fail to set it. The Civil Code solution of treat-
ing the condition as fulfilled will not suffice to determine the
amount. DCC § 2-305(3) solves this problem by giving the other
party the option of fulfilling the condition or treating the contract
as cancelled.
An exemplary case. A recent example of the Louisiana approach
to open price terms can be found in Princeville Canning Co. 'IJ.
Hamilton.43 There the buyer and seller contracted for future deliv-
ery of seed potatoes with the stipulation that the price was subject
to "market rise." When the seller failed to deliver the buyer sued,
apparently for the difference between the contract price and the
price at which he had to cover. The seller claimed that the contract
price alleged by the buyer was too low, that there was no method
established in the contract for determining market price and that
the contract was therefore unenforceable. The court agreed.
In a case of this type there is, perhaps, no difference between
finding a contract and not finding one. The buyer should have to
show that the "cover" price was reasonable, that is, at or near
"market" price. Since the latter price is the contract price there are
no damages. Yet, this is not always the case. A buyer may have
special damages, for example, in a situation where he is unable to
cover at all or only after a delay which causes a shutdown of opera-
tions. Contract or no contract may well be a distinction with a dif-
ference.
The Princeville Canning case seems to be the type of situation
in which the buyer is attempting to secure a source of supply and
the seller a market, but the latter is unwilling to take the risk of
unfavorable price fluctuations. The present Louisiana approach
permits the seller to use a clause inserted for his protection as an
escape route from all obligation under the contract. Of course, it
is not really clear in Princeville Canning what "subject to market
rise" meant: (1) renegotiation of price in the light of the market,
42 La. Civil Code art. 2460 (1870).
43 159 So. 2d 14 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
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(2) market price was to be the contract price, or (3) buyer (or
seller) could reset the price in accordance with a rise in the market.
Whatever the interpretation there was an apparent intent to con-
tract and a reasonably certain basis for giving a minimum remedy,
although that remedy may have turned out to be general damages
in the amount of zero plus any provable special damages. That is
all that would be required under Dee §§ 2-204 and 2-305.
The Quantity Term
The elimination of the certainty of price rule in article 2464
would not result in any inconsistencies in the Louisiana law. It
would bring the treatment of open price contracts into line with the
treatment of open quantity, that is, "requirements" or "output,"
contracts. These contracts have been consistently upheld, in the face
of challenges on the ground that they embody potestative condi-
tions, by imposing a standard gf good faith performance through
interpretation of the agreements.44 This result and its rationale
would be continued under Dee § 2-306 (1) :
(1) A term which measures the quantity by the output of
the seller or the requirements of the buyer means such actual
output or requirements as may occur in good faith, except
that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to any
stated estimate or in the absence of a stated estimate to any
normal or otherwise comparable prior output or require-
ments may be tendered or demanded.
Moreover, where the question was one of damages, at least one
Louisiana court has been willing to accept a projection of the
quantity which would have been required had the buyer performed
as a reasonably certain basis for giving a remedy.45 Hence, in
respect of open quantity terms Dee §§ 2-204 and 2-306 (1) would
make no change in the Louisiana position.
Other open terms
Dee § 2-311 (1) provides:
(1) An agreement for sale which is otherwise sufficiently
definite (subsection (3) of Section 2-204) to be a contract is
not made invalid by the fact that it leaves particulars of
performance to be specified by one of the parties. Any such
44 See United Carbon Co. v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 176 La. 929, 147
So. 37 (1933); C. A. Andrews Coal Co. v. Board of Directors, 151 La. 695, 92
So. 303 (1922); Crusel v. Tierce, 118 La. 292, 42 So. 940 (1907); Dockson
Gas Co. v. S. & W. Constr. Co., 12 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1943) (dis-
tinguishing earlier apparently contrary cases).
45 Dockson Gas Co. v. S. & W. Constr. Co., 12 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1943) ; see also Alexandria Cooperage Co. v. E. S. Duck Lbr. Co., 153 La. 438,
444-45, 96 So. 24, 28 (1923). But see Mason v. Ruffin, 130 So. 843 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1930).
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specification must be made in good faith and within limits
set by commercial reasonableness.
Two particulars commonly left to specification after "closing a
deal" are "assortment" and shipping arrangements. UCC § 2-311
(2) provides:
(2) Unless otherwise agreed specifications relating to as-
sortment of the goods are at the buyer's option and except
as otherwise provided in subsections (1) (c) and (3) of
Section 2-319 specifications or arrangements relating to
shipment are at the seller's option.
At least one Louisiana case clearly holds that leaving specifica-
tion of shipping instructions open does not make the contract unen-
forceable because uncertain.46 There the buyer had the option as
to shipping instructions. The court found that, having failed to give
them in a reasonable time, he could not hold the seller in breach for
non-delivery. Presumably he would also have been required to give
"commercially reasonable" instructions.
The problem of "assortment" is more difficult. Buyer's option
as to assortment may mean that the total price of the goods is
uncertain until the option is exercised. For example, in a leading
common-law case, Wilhelm Lubrication Co. v. Brattrud,41 the con-
tract called for definite quantities of various types of motor oil, but
left the choice of weight of oil within the type to be specified by the
buyer. Since the price varied with the weight, the buyer's repudia-
tion of the contract left the total price under the contract uncertain.
In this situation the court found itself unable to award damages
because it did not know what assortment the buyer would have
taken and, therefore, could not determine what loss the seller had
in terms of profit or resale. The result would clearly be the same
under Louisiana certainty of price requirements.
Not so under UCC §§ 2-204, 2-305, and 2-311. Only intent to
contract and a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate
l'emedy are required. Assuming the first is found, the court need
not determine the exact loss to the plaintiff in order to make a mini-
mum award. It can merely take the assortment in respect of which
a subsequent breach would result in the least damage to the plain-
tiff. He has surely suffered that much loss.
2. Acceptance not conforming to the offer
One of the major innovations of the Code is section 2-207:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance
or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable
46 W. E. Robinson Co. v. Louisiana Box Co., 1 La. App. 272 (1924).
41 197 Minn. 626, 268 N.W. 634 (1936).
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time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms
additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon,
unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to
the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as pro-
posals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such
terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of
the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been
given or is given within a reasonable time after
notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the exis-
tence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale
although the writings of the parties do not otherwise estab-
lish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular con-
tract consist of those terms on which the "writings of the
parties agree, together with any supplementary terms in-
corporated under any other provisions of this Act.
This section is designed primarily to solve the problems which
arise in the so-called "battle of the forms," that is, the common
situation of disagreement between standard clauses in the pur-
chaser's order form and the seller's acknowledgement form.
The traditional "acceptance-must-conform-to-the-offer" rule
treats contracts entered into on forms containing such printed
"boilerplate" as negotiated agreements. Where buyer's and seller's
terms disagree, and there is no conduct establishing a contract,
there is said to be no contract. Where there has been shipment and
acceptance of the goods, courts find a contract on the terms of the
party who last sent a fOl'Ill. before performance. The rationale for
this "last shot" rule is that the terms of the party last verbalizing
his demands have been impliedly accepted by the other party's
unqualified action under the contract.
Both results ignore the realities of the situation. In most cases
there has been no haggling over terms such that differences in the
printed forms indicate failure to agree; the reasonable commercial
expectation is that there is "a deal." Moreover, who sends the last
form before performance may be purely fortuitous. A seller mail-
ing his acknowledgment form before shipment gets his terms in,
but if he ships first, he has accepted the buyer's terms.
Section 2-207 (1) would solve the "no contract" problem by
treating ~ definite and seasonable acceptance as an acceptance,
notwithstanding its conflicting terms, unless such acceptance is
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"expressly conditional" on assent to the additional or different
terms. In practice, accepting parties wishing to avoid the offeror's
terms will probably put "expressly conditional" language in their
forms. Moreover, offerors can be expected to expressly limit accep-
tance to the terms of the offer under section 2-207 (2) (a). Here
irresistible force meets immovable object, and there is no contract
until performance. When there is such performance, however, the
party firing the last shot does not get a contract on his lopsided
terms. Section 2-207 (3) abrogates the "last shot" principle by
making the contract contain only agreed terms and the suppletive
provisions of the Code.
"Battle of the forms" has not been a significant problem in
adjudicated cases in Louisiana, but disagreement between the terms
of offers and acceptances has been. Article 1805 of the Civil Code
requires that an acceptance "be in all things conformable to the
offer." This strict rule is mitigated only where the circumstances
are such that the offer necessa1'ily implies assent to the modification
contained in the acceptance.48
Mason v. Ruffin,49 typifies the strict conformity approach. In
that case it appears that the defendant in reconvention offered to
sell all his cattle, estimated to number about 125 to 150, to the
plaintiff. The latter accepted. Mter delivering 34 the defendant
l'efused to make further deliveries. Plaintiff claimed that although
there was no agreement on the exact number, he had accepted the
offer for a minimum of 100 by writing on a check he gave to the.
defendant the words "deposit on 100 head of cattle." This claim to
have accepted for 100 seems to have been made in order to fix the
amount of damages, i.e., lost profits on the resale of 66 cows. The
result was the court's finding that there was never any contract.
The court reasoned that under the prevailing rule the acceptance
for 100 was not conformable to the offer of total output. Hence,
there was no contract unless the defendant could be held to have
accepted the counteroffer (acceptance) for 100 by his acceptance
of the check.50 Even with convincing proof of the check's notation,
its acceptance is not a totally unambiguous acceptance of the plain-
•tiff's terms. Here the check when offered in evidence had no nota-
tion. The plaintiff claimed it had been erased, but with this weak-
ness in the evidence the court was understandably reluctant to say
that the defendant had accepted a counteroffer for 100.
Perhaps the plaintiff made a tactical error. His approach did
not really give the court a chance to assess the contract as one
48 La. Civil Code art. 1807 (1870).
49 130 So. 843 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1930).
50 See, e.g., Chiquita Trinkets, Inc. v. Mardi Gras Prod., Inc., 164 So. 2d
375 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964). .
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involving an indeterminate quantity. Had he done so it is at least
possible that the court would have found a contract and would have
awarded damages based on the defendant's estimated (125-150)
"output." Certainly, this result would be reached under DCC
§§ 2-204(3) and 2-306, unless the defendant showed that after a
good faith effort his output was or would have been less than the
estimate.
Since section 2-207 of the DCC applies to situations of noncon-
forming acceptances generally, not just battle of the forms prob-
lems, we might well consider how it would affect the decision in a
case like Mason. Subsection (1) of section 2-207 requires only that
there be a "definite and seasonable" acceptance, notwithstanding
the inclusion of additional or different terms. If the check were such
an acceptance, and we shall assume for the moment that it was, it
clearly was not expressly conditional on assent to its additional or
different terms. It is therefore not a counteroffer and we have a
contract. The only problem is on whose terms.
Subsection (2) of section 2-207 speaks to this problem. If the
acceptance contains additional terms, they become proposals for
additions to the contract. Here the acceptance contains not an
"additional" but a "different" term. Hence, that term would not
become part of the contract. Even were it construed as "additional"
and had the defendant (merchant) failed subsequently to object to
it, the parties would not have had a contract for 100 head on this
set of facts under section 2-207. The offer itself objects to terms
"different" from the ones proposed,51 and moreover it would mate-
rially alter the contract.52 The contract is, thus, on the seller's terms,
that is, for his total output.
The alternative approach to the Mason facts under section 2-207
would be to find that there was no definite and seasonable accep-
tance verbally or in writing. The question then is how to account
for the delivery of 34 head of cattle. Obviously the parties are
acting as if they have a contract, and under section 2-207 (3) such
conduct may establish a contract. The terms of the agreement are
those on which the parties agreed (the price per head) and those
supplied by other sections of the Code. To supply the quantity we
are thrown back on section 2-306. But section 2-306 does not really
cover this situation. The question is not the permissibility of an
indefinite term, but whether a definite or an indefinite term was
contemplated.
Failing to prove that either the definite or the indefinite term
was finally agreed upon, the buyer might yet rely on section 2-204
51 UCC § 2-207 (2) (c).
52 UCC § 2-207 (2) (b).
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(3). A clear intent to contract can be derived from the delivery and
acceptance of the thirty-four head of cattle. The issue could then be
cast in terms of whether there was a reasonably certain basis for
giving a remedy. On this question it would not be unreasonable for
the trier of fact to conclude that a minimum of 100 cows were to
be transferred and to award damages on that basis. Of course, it
might be equally reasonable to conclude that no figure had been
proved with sufficient definiteness. In that case the buyer would
lose. He would lose, not on the artificial ground that there was
never a contract, but on the ground that he failed to prove with
sufficient definiteness what minimal compliance with the contract
would have entailed.5211
In modern commercial dealings involving large numbers of
transactions which require pre-planned rather than negotiated
terms, the approach of section 2-207 seems a considerable advance
over the old common law or Louisiana "mirror image" rules. Simi-
larly, the VCC provisions on open term contracts add needed flex-
ibility to the law of sales; a flexibility which may allow courts and
lawyers to come to grips in a more meaningful manner with com-
mercial practices ranging from highly informal agreements to
increasingly sophisticated techniques for allocating market and
other risks.53 There has always been a degree of prepositional
ambiguity in the freedom of contract principle. The VCC might be
viewed merely as emphasizing freedom to contract, whereas the
Louisiana Civil Code emphasizes freedom from contract.
B. Othel· requisites to formation
1. Formalities
As mentioned earlier, the VCC contains no general provisions
on conventional obligations. The requirements of party capacity,
of a legal subject matter, and of cause and/or consideration are
left to pre-existing law. The VCC does, however, contain formal
requirements in its "statute of frauds" section.54 These provisions
5211 The buyer would also have a statute of frauds problem. See uee § 2-201,
infra at note 54.
53 The present failure of commercial law and the court system to provide
adequate solutions to business problems is reflected in the increasing referral
of disputes to the more flexible procedures of commercial arbitration. See
Mentschikoff, The Significance of Arbiftration-A Preliminary Inquiry, 17 Law
& eontemp. Prob. 698 (1952).
54 uee § 2-201 provides:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the
sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of
action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that
a contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the
party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent 01'
broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states
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would radically change existing law,55 and in this writer's opinion,
for the worse. Common law jurisdictions seem to have had a great
.deal more difficulty with writing requirements in the sale of goods
than Louisiana has had with attempts to enforce non-existent
transactions.56 Fortunately, the DCC has altered some of the more
objectionable features of previous statutes51 and may thJ:ough its
exceptions now render unenforceable only the oral contracts of
persons willing to risk perjuring themselves.58
A discussion of the effects of running afoul of the statute or of
the requisites of a sufficient memorandum to take a contract out of
the statute are really beyond the scope of this article. Roughly
speaking a contract made unenforceable for lack of a sufficent writ-
ing would operate as a natural obligation,59 and the liberality of
a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under this para-
graph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing.
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in
confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received
and the party receiving it has reason to !mow its contents, it satisfies the
requirements of subsection (1) against such party unless written notice
of objection to its contents is given within ten days after it is :received.
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of sub-
'section (1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and
are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the
seller's business and the seller, before notice of repudiation is
received and under circumstances which reasonably indicate
that the goods are for the buyer, has made either a substantial
beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their
procurement; or .
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his
pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for
sale was made, but the contract is not enforceable under this
provision beyond the quantity of goods admitted; or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made and
accepted or which have been received and accepted (Sec.
2-606). ,
55 La. Civil Code art. 2277 (1870). The jurisprudence has been extremely
lenient with the article 2277 requirements. See, e.g., Cormier v. Douet, 219 La.
915, 54 So. 2d 177 (1951).
56 See generally Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales, 59 Yale
L.J. 821 (1950); Holahan, Contract Formalities and the Uniform Commercial
. Code, 3 Vill. L. Rev. ;t (1957). 'But see Comment, The Statute of Frauds and
tlte BU§iness Community, 66 Yale L.J. 1038 (1957) (suggesting that statutes
merely require some improvements to reflect general business practice and
understanding) •
51 E.g., UCC § 2-201 (2), which eliminates the possibility that one party is
b.ound where the other is not.
"Merchant" here will apply to virtually anyone acting in a mercantile
capacity. See U.CC § 2-104, Co~ent 2.
58 UCC § 2-201 (d) and (b).
59 La. Civil Code arts. 1758(1) and 1759 (1870). These articles when
combined with articles 3036 and 3299 and with the jurisprudence under article
2275 (see, e.g., Emerson v. Shirley, 188 La. 196, 175 So. 909 (1937» suggest
that an unenforceable oral contract for sale would have many of the same
effects on the legal relations of' the parties ·in Louisiana as in common law
jurisdictions. See generally 2 A. Corbin, Contracts § 279, 20-23 (1950). The
only subs,idiary effect listed by Corbin which would clearly not be applicable
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the memorandum requirement is perhaps only exceeded by the
French doctrine of "beginning of proof."60
2. A retU1"1~ to civilian principles
Strangely enough all Dnited States jurisdictions other than
Louisiana now have, through adoption of the DCC, statutory pro-
visions which make firm offers binding for a stated or reasonable
period61 and which eliminate the necessity for consideration in
contract modifications.62 Louisiana on the other hand is left with
common law principles on revocability of offers63 and on the neces-
sity for consideration to support contract modifications64 which
were accepted by the jurisprudence in the face of specific codal
provisions65 and general civilian theory.66
a. Firm offers. The adoption of the firm offer provision of DCC
§ 2-205 would not have the broad effect of a proper interpretation
of article 1809 of the Civil Code because only written offers giving
an assurance that they will be held open would be irrevocable. These
requirements are apparently meant to have the cautionary effect of
consideration, as well as to serve evidentiary purposes, and they
therefore should dispose of any submerged policy grounds in the
Louisiana jurisprudence which has denied effect to article 1809. Of
course a bargained-for option under article 2462 could still be made
informally and for a longer period than the three month limit on
firm offers in section 2-205 of the DCC.
b. Modifications. The DCC provision on modification, section
2-209, is not a model of clarity. It provides:
(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this
Article needs no consideration to be binding.
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or
rescission except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise
modified or rescinded, but except as between merchants such
a requirement on a form supplied by the merchant must be
separately signed by the other party.
in Louisiana is the allowance given a creditor elsewhere to impute payment
to an unenforceable obligation. La. Civil Code art. 2166 (1870).
60 The Louisiana jurisprudence under article 2275 has also been very
liberal. See discussion in 21 Tul. L. Rev. 706, 709 (1947); but see Bordelon v.
Crabtree, 216 La. 345, 43 So. 2d 682 (1949).
61 UCC § 2-205.
62 UCC § 2-209.
63 See, e.g., National Co. v. Navarro, 149 So. 2d 648 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1963); Loeb v. Johnson, 142 So. 2d 518 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
64 E.g., John M. Parker & Co. v. Guillot, 118 La. 223, 42 So. 782 (1907).
However, a very liberal view has been taken toward what constitutes a suffi-
cient consideration. See O'Brien v. Willis, 14 La. App. 638, 129 So. 440 (1930).
65 La. Civil Code arts. 1809 and 2201 (1870).
66 See, e.g., Smith, A Refresher Course in ,Cause, 12 La. L. Rev. 2 (1951).
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(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of
this Article (Section 2-201) must be satisfied if the contract
as modified is within its provisions.
(4) Although an attempt at modification or rescission
does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (2) or (3)
it can operate as a waiver.
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an execu-
tory portion of the contract may retract the waiver by
reasonable notification received by the other party that
strict performance will be required of any term waived, un-
less the retraction would be unjust in view of a material
change of position in reliance on the waiver.
The basic change is in subsection (1). Comment 2 to section
2-209 indicates that the protection which consideration afforded
a party against "forced" modifications during performance are
henceforth to be supplied by the DCC requirement of good faith.
Nor will a mere technical consideration support a modification made
in bad faith. There seems no reason to treat the "good faith"
standard as exclusively applicable here. The DCC concept of "un-
conscionability" should also apply and Louisiana developments on
"economic duress"67 would remain in force.
Difficulties in interpretation arise when we attempt to sort out
the relationship between "modification," "waiver" and "estoppel"
in subsections (2) through (5) of section 2-209. It is particularly
troublesome to keep these concepts distinct when we realize that all
of them may be accomplished by conduct as well as verbally.68 The
Louisiana jurisprudence, for example, has tended to lump all three
together by finding that the acceptance of performance which
deviates from the express terms of the contract operates as a
"waiver" or "modification," which "estops" the accepting party
from demanding strict compliance with those terms.69
The question of whether one is dealing with a "modification"
or a "waiver" or an "estoppel" becomes critical where a court must
decide whether a party who is "estopped" by previous conduct from
demanding strict compliance as to executed portions of the con-
tract has also irrevocably tlwaived" his right to strict compliance
on the executory part, that is, whether the parties have by their
conduct agreed to a "modification" of the contract. This should
rarely be a problem where modification requires consideration, but,
of course, DCC § 2-209 (1) abolishes that requirement. Moreover,
that section really gives no guidance on whether an interpretation
67 See especially, Bryant v. Levy, 52 La. Ann. 1649, 28 So. 191 (1900).
68 UCC § 2-208(3).
69 See, e.g., Lillis v. Owens, 21 So. 2d 185 (La. App. Orl. 1945); Bacas v.
Mandot, 3 Or!. App. 32.4 (1906).
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favoring "modification" or simply "waiver" should be applied to
ambiguous conduct. One should think the latter would be preferred
in an ambiguous situation because of its more limited effect. Any
problems of detrimental reliance in respect of future performance
could be handled under the provisions of subsection (5).
A second terminological difficulty involves the interpretation of
"waiver" in subsection (4). How can an agreement which fails as
a "modification," because the contract requires such modifications
to be in writing, yet serve as a "waiver"170 Presumably a contrac-
tual provision requiring written modifications would, with the
exception of waivers effecting an "estoppel" in the sense of the
final clause of subsection (5), also require written "waivers." The
solution seems to be to read subsection (4) as simply classifying
an unenforceable "modification" as a "waiver," whose effect will
then be determined in accordance with subsection (5). Of course
subsection (5) has nothing to say about the effect of a subsection
(4) "waiver" on executed portions of the contract, but it is highly
likely that there will appear in such cases sufficient reliance to
result in an estoppel.
III. PERFORMANCE
Buyers and sellers under the Dee are expected to do the custom-
ary things-the former to accept and to pay, the latter to deliver
and to warrant. Section 2-301 actually describes the seller's obliga-
tions as "to transfer and deliver," but it is obvious from other
sections that he also impliedly warrants. Moreover, the significance
of "transfer" is elusive, apart from warranty of title questions, in
a code which seeks to insure that no rights of the buyer or seller
turn on the position of abstract title.
There are, of course, many special provisions and problems in
respect of these simply-stated obligations. The discussion of a few
of them will suffice to give something of the flavor of the Dee ap-
proach to performance.
A. Pm·fect tendm' by sellers: A methodological exe1'cise
The buyer's right to reject a non-conforming tender seems un-
qualified under Dee § 2-601:
Subject to the provisions of this Article on breach in
installment contracts (Section 2-612) and unless otherwise
agreed under the sections on contractual1imitations of rem-
edy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719), if the goods or the tender of
70 The one court which had an opportunity to rule on this point failed to
mention the UCC. C.LT. Corp. v. Jonnet, 419 Pa. 435, 214 A.2d 620 (1965).
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delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract, the
buyer may
(a) reject the whole; or
(b) accept the whole; or
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the
rest.
There is considerable Louisiana authority which would support
that proposition where the nonconformity relates to the contract
of shipment,71 the form of documents72 or the quantity delivered.73
(We shall for the moment ignore defects in quality.) Yet, as in
many instances in the Commercial Code, the broad statement of one
section may be significantly qualified by other provisions.
For example, section 2-614(1) provides:
(1) Where without fault of either party the agreed
berthing, loading, or unloading facilities fail or an agreed
type of carrier becomes unavailable or the agreed manner of
delivery otherwise becomes commercially impracticable but
a commercially reasonable substitute is available, such sub-
stitute performance must be tendered and accepted.
(2) If the agreed means or manner of payment fails be-
cause of domestic or foreign governmental regulation, the
seller may withhold or stop delivery unless the buyer pro-
vides a means or manner of payment which is commercially
a substantial equivalent. If delivery has already been taken,
payment by the means or in the manner provided by the
regulation discharges the buyer's obligation unless the regu-
lation is discriminatory, oppressive or predatory.
Further, section 2-50474 allows rejection for lack of notification
of shipment or failure to make a proper contract for shipment only
where "material delay or loss ensues." The question in these situa-
71 Baltic American Feed Corporation Cases, 152 So. 105, 107, 108 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1934); California Fruit Exchange v. Meyer, 8 La. App. 198, 201
(1927).
72 Lundy v. Pfeifer, 162 La. 355, 110 So. 556 (1926).
73 T.A.D. Co. v. Savage, 6 La. App. 570 (1927).
74 Where the seller is l'equired or authorized to send the goods to the
buyer and the contract does not require him to deliver them at a par-
ticular destination, then unless otherwise agreed he must
(a) put the goods in the possession of such a carrier and make such
a contract for their transportation as may be reasonable having
regard to the nature of the goods and other circumstances of
the case; and
(b) obtain and promptly deliver or tender in due form any docu-
ment necessary to enable the buyer to obtain possession of the
goods or otherwise required by the agreement or by usage of
trade; and
(c) promptly notify the buyer of the shipment. Failure to notify
the buyer.under paragraph (c) -{Jr-·to make a proper contract
under paragra'ph· (a) is a ground for rejection only if material
delay or loss ensues. .
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tions is thus not perfect tender, but materiality of the breach. Sec-
tion 2-504 along with sections 2-31075 and 2-50576 would, for
example, definitely change present Louisiana rules on the effect of
an unjustified reservation of security.77
Breach by reason of any improper tender may also be avoided
under section 2-508:
(1) Where any tender or delivery by the seller is re-
jected because non-conforming and the time for perfor-
mance has not yet expired, the seller may seasonably notify
the buyer of his intention to cure and may then within the
contract time make a conforming delivery.
(2) Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender
which the seller had reasonable grounds to believe would be
acceptable with or without money allowance the seller may
if he seasonably notifies the buyer have a further reasonable
time to substitute a conforming tender.
The application of this section, particularly sub-part (2), will
depend much on factual context, but certainly a seller who intends
to perform should seldom find himself in the position of irretriev-
ably breaching his obligation to tender goods in accordance with
the contract, thereby giving the buyer the right to reject the whole
of his performance. The "commercial reasonableness" of these solu-
tions is patent.
A somewhat comparable result has been reached in Louisiana
in relation to questions of shortages in tendered goods by dis-
tinguishing between "entire" and "divisible" contracts.7S Thus
existing law is more favorable for the seller than Dee § 2-601
standing alone, which seems to give the buyer an option to treat
the contract either as entire or divisible, yet less favorable than
Dee § 2-508's right to cure, which should apply even where the
seller's obligation is entire.
One hazy spot in this picture is what the Dee intended to do
about defects in the tender of documents. Presumably section 2-508
75 (b) if the seller is authorized to send the goods he may ship them
under reservation, and may tender the documents of title, but
the buyer may inspect the goods after their arrival before pay-
ment is due unless such inspection is inconsistent with the terms
of the contract (Section 2-513).
76 (2) When shipment by the seller with reservation of a security
interest is in violation of the contract for sale it constitutes an improper
contract for transportation within the preceding section but impairs
neither the rights given to the buyer by shipment and identification of
the goods to the contract nor the seller's powers as a holder of a
negotiable document.
77 See, e.g., California Fruit Exchange v. Meyer, 8 La. App. 198, 201
(1927).
7S Compare J. K. Armsby & Co. v. Santo Oteri, 4 Orl. App. 385 (1907)
with Wrenn v. Lafayette Furn. Co., 151 So. 148 (La. App. Or!. 1933).
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applies to such defects. The materiality standard of section 2-504
and the substituted performance provisions of section 2-614 also
seem to allow the making of contracts for shipment, and hence the
tender of documents of title, which are not strictly in accordance
with the contract. Yet comment 7 to section 2-503 indicates a very
strict attitude toward contractually required documents, section
2-504 excludes documentary defects from its materiality standard,
and section 2-612 (2), while otherwise liberalizing the perfect
tender rule of section 2-601 in relation to installment contracts,
allows rejection of any installment for any documentary defect
unless the seller gives adequate assurance of cure.
These sets of provisions are not in direct conflict but they at
least tend to "look in different directions." Also, there is some
difficulty in determining just what defect in documents should in-
clude. Is, for example, the use of a shipper's-order-notify-shipper
bill under a contract requiring notification to the buyer an improper
contract for shipment which allows rejection only if materially
prejudicial to the buyer, or is it the tendering of defective docu-
ments permitting rejection at the buyer's option ?79
Traditionally strict compliance with documentary terms has
been required, perhaps on the theory that this is justified in a situa-
tion where the buyer must pay without inspection of the goods. If
that is the rationale, a court faced with this problem of the effect
of documentary defects under the DeC should then examine the
sections on buyer's rights of inspection to determine whether it is
dealing with a situation where payment is due against documents
before inspection. In so doing it would find that the right to inspec-
tion before payment is preserved wherever feasible even in con-
tracts requiring payment against documents.so Moreover, payment
before inspection is not an acceptance and does not bar the right
to inspection, to reject the goods or any other remedy.s1 Hence
under the DCC there may be little need to treat documentary
defects differently than other defective tenders. This conclusion
would suggest a preference for treating such defects as involving
only improper contracts for shipment wherever possible.
However, there are other considerations involved here. First,
payment against documents will often be required before the goods
are available for inspection. More importantly, the buyer may be
financing on the documents or reselling without taking delivery. If
so, any documentary defect could be critical. Indeed, the commer-
79 Lundy v. Pfeifer, 162 La. 355, 110 So. 556 (1926) treats a similar defect
as permitting rejection.
so uee § 2~321 (3).
81 uee § 2-512 (2).
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cial importance of this use of documents of title virtually requires
that we read the DCC as continuing the perfect tender rule, un-
diluted by reclassification of problems into the contract-for-ship-
ment mold, whenever a defect in necessary documents is involved.
.As the above discussion illustrates, article 2 functions as a code.
Its provisions are interconnected and the use of one section re-
quires some considerable appreciation of its relationship to many
others. Moreover, like any code it has gaps, and underlying policy
decisions are not always apparent. Louisiana lawyers are not un-
accustomed to dealing with such legislation.
B. Assurance of performance: A new right
The discussion of defective tender should also serve to illustrate
the DCC's concern in the performance area with the provision of
flexible procedures for adjustment of differences while maintaining
contractual relationships.82 But the maintenance of these relation-
ships is only valuable if security of expectations is preserved. Enter
DCC § 2-609:
(1) A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each
party that the other's expectation of receiving due perfor-
mance will not be impaired. When reasonable grounds for
insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either
party the other may in writing demand adequate assurance
of due performance and until he receives such assurance
may if commercially reasonable suspend any performance
for which he has not already received the agreed return.
(2) Between merchants the reasonableness of grounds
for insecurity and the adequacy of any assurance offered
shall be determined according to commercial standards.
(3) Acceptance of any improper delivery or payment
does not prejudice the aggrieved party's right to demand
adequate assurance of future perfol1nance.
(4) After receipt of a justified demand failure to pro-
vide within a reasonable time not exceeding thirty days such
assurance of due performance as is adequate undel' the cir-
cumstances of the particular case is a repudiation of the
contract.
When required to permit cure or prohibited from rejecting a defec-
tive tender, either party, if insecure, may require that some security
be given to insure performance. Failure to give such security is a
repudiation of the contract.
Of course, section 2-609 is not limited to "defective tender"
situations. It can apply to any situation where the seller or buyer
has Ioeasonable grounds to fear non-performance. The concept of
82 See also uee § 2-511 (2).
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assurance of performance thus becomes a general device whereby
one party may be given a means for determining whether he should
treat the contract as breached.
A major field for application of section 2-609 would seem to be
in cases involving what is commonly called "anticipatory breach,"
that is, defective part performance83 or anticipatory repudiation.84
Under previous common law rules the seller and buyer were in a
difficult position where the problem was a prospective inability to
perform. If, for example, it appeared that the buyer would wrong-
fully reject a tender when made because of financial difficulties,
this was not necessarily an anticipatory breach of the contract. The
seller had two choices: (1) perform in the hope that the buyer
would reciprocate, or (2) change position and hope that he had done
so justifiably. If so, any breach would be chargeable to the buyer.85
The buyer, on the other hand, was faced with the possibility of
being held in breach of the contract although willing and able to
perform when the time came for performance.
Under UCC § 2-609 the seller could in the described situation
demand assurance of performance and failing to obtain it within a
reasonable time treat the contract as repudiated. The buyer who
is not yet in breach of the contract apparently has the right to give
an assurance, thereby preserving his rights under the contract.86
Section 2-609 would change the Louisiana law in some respects.
Although it now seems clear that anticipatory repudiation will
give the aggrieved party a right to an immediate action for breach87
or a defense when sued for non-performance88 there is some ques-
tion concerning the seller's rights in relation to a prospective in-
ability to perform not amounting to a repudiation. Article 2042 of
the Civil Code presently allows conservatory action in a situation
of prospective non-performance, presumably including suspension
of the insecure party's performance, but there is no general right
to demand security. Article 2488 contains provisions similar to
section 2-609, including the giving of security, but it applies only
to situations of insolvency or bankruptcy. Moreover, while allowing
a suspension of performance, it is not clear that a failure to give
security under article 2488 would result in a repudiation justifying
other remedial action.
83 UCC § 2-612.
84 UCC §§ 2-610 and 2-611.
85 Restatement (First) of Contracts § 323 (1932).
86 See Wrightstone, Inc. v. Motler, 11 Cumbo L.J. 165 (Ct. Com. Pleas Pa.
1961). .
81 Marek v. McHardy, 234 La. 841, 101 So. 2d 689 (1958).
88 Pacholik v. Gray, 187 So. 2d 480 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966) ; see generally
Comment, 7 Tul. L. Rev. 586 (1933) and Comment, 20 La. L. Rev. 119 (1959).
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There is nothing essentially contrary to existing Louisiana law
in section 2-609. It merely establishes a right in each party to a sale
to reasonable security of expectations under the contract. If on
demand for assurance the obligor refuses or fails to provide it,
there is an active breach. Article 2052's proscription of premature
demand would not be infringed. DCC § 2-609 creates a separate
right to security of expectations which is demandable when the
cause for insecurity arises.
There is some question in this writer's mind that section 2-609
will have very significant effects. Although it changes the difficult
question of ''Will he breach?" to the somewhat narrower one of
"Am I sufficiently insecure to treat a failure to give security as a
repudiation?", the answering party still acts at his peril. However,
section 2-609 at least gets the relevant problem, security of expec-
tations, into the forefront of any subsequent judicial inquiry.
C. Warranty
Any discussion of performance must concern itself with war-
ranty, if for no other reason than the quantitative importance of
warranty issues in reported appellate cases. In this area the DCC
may appear a radical departure from the simple, almost classical,
provisions of the Civil Code, but there are few differences of sub-
stance.
1. Warranty of Quality
a. Express warranty.
Section 2-313 of the DCC provides:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as
follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the
seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and
becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the goods shall conform to
the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of
the basis of the bargain creates an express war-
ranty that the goods shall conform to the descrip-
tion.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the whole of the goods shall conform to the
sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express
warranty that the seller use formal words such as "warrant"
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or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a
warranty, but an affil'mation merely of the value of the goods
or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion
or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
Express warranty of quality is treated in two articles of the
Louisiana Civil Code.
Art. 2529. A declaration made in good faith by the seller,
that the thing sold has some quality which it is found not to
have, gives rise to a redhibition, if this quality was the prin-
cipal motive for making the purchase.
Art. 2547. A declaration made by the seller, that the
thing sold possesses some quality which he knows it does not
possess, comes within the definition of fraud, and ought to be
judged according to the rules laid down on the subject, under
the title: Of Conventjonal Obligations.
It may, according to circumstances, give rise to the
redhibition, or to a reduction of the price, and to damages in
favor of the buyer.
Leaving aside lor the moment89 the question of what is recoverable
for breach of an express watranty, the Louisiana position on what
constitutes such a warranty seems generally in accordance with
section 2~313.
While the jurisprudence on the effect of a sale by "sample" is
something less than consistent,90 the courts are agreed that the
bulk delivered must conform to the sample. Exemplary of the
present approach is Whitman & Co. v. Solomon.91 The court there
clearly indicated, without once mentioning the word warranty,
(1) that an offer of a sample is a declaration of quality giving the
purchaser the power of rejecting or diminishing the price of a non-
conforming bulk and (2) that the buyer cannot reject the goods
on the basis of defects discoverable on simple inspection, unless he
does so within a reaSOnable time after delivery. This is something
less than a statement that a sale by sample creates an express war-
ranty, but the court certainly seems to be thinking in terms of
redhibition and cites article 2521 as its only codal authority.
"Description" also creates an express warranty under present
law, if (and this applies equally to sample) the statement goes to
the "principal motive" of the transaction. This principal motive
limitation seems to be essentially the same as DCC § 2-313's re-
quirement that the statement go to the "basis of the bargain." The
question under both Codes would be whether the statement should
89 See discussion infra at notes 188-92 and accompanying text.
90 See Comment, 23 Tul. L. Rev. 83, 94-5 (1948).
91 144 So. 292 (La. App. Orl. 1932).
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reasonably be construed as a significant inducement to the buyer's
purchase.92
Louisiana law would be changed by UCC § 2-316's provision
that express warranties cannot be disclaimed, for the existing juris-
prudence has consistently allowed disclaimer of warranty by sam-
ple.93
b. Implied Wa1"1"anty.
(1) Me1"chantability. The basis provision here is section 2-314:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a
warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in
a contract for their sale if "the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving
for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the
premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the con-
tract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average
quality; within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such
goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agree-
ment, of even land, quality and quantity within each
unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as
the agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact
made on the container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other
implied warranties may arise from course of dealing or
usage of trade.
The corresponding Civil Code provision is article 2520:
Redhibition is the avoidance of a sale on account of some
vice or defect in the thing sold, which renders it either abso-
lutely useless, or its use so inconvenient and imperfect, that
it must be supposed that the buyer would not have purchased
it, had he known of the vice.
These statutes hardly appear comparable, but their general
effect is similar. The basic criterion under article 2520 is whether
92 Compare Atlantic-Gulf Supply Corp. v. McDonald, 175 So. 2d 6 (La.
App" 4th Cir. 1965) with Seely v. White Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 17,403 P.2d
145 (1965).
93 See cases cited at 23 Tul. L. Rev. 83, 95, n.89 (1948).
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the goods are fit for the general purpose for which such goods are
normally sold.94 It is not necessary to show an actual "defect."95
The same may be said of VCC § 2-314, although some more specific
indicia of "warranted" quality, drawn from case law, have been
included. The comment to section 2-314 makes it fairly clear that
subsection 2 (c) is the basic guideline, that the list in subsection (2)
is not exhaustive and that the content of the warranty is a question
of commercial practice.
The extension of implied warranty to sales of food in a restau-
rant in section 2-313(1) would not change Louisiana law.96 How-
ever, the limitation of implied warranty to sales by a "merchant
with respect to goods of that kind" would work a change. Presently
the implication of warranties extends to sales by any vendor. As-
suming that the redhibition articles of the Civil Code were not
repealed on adoption of the VCC, and they probably should not be
since they apply equally to sales of immovables, difficult problems
of gauging the effect of the enactment of the VCC arise.
One interpretation might be that section 2-314 would merely
remove merchant sales from the Civil Code scheme, leaving non-
merchant sales subject to redhibition. This interpretation is ques-
tionable. The VCC has in most other jurisdictions replaced statu-
tory or common law principles of implied warranty which involved
a similar limitation.97 Hence a retention of redhibition in non-
merchant sales would be non-uniform.
Yet there is some authority in the VCC itself for bringing
redhibition back through a side door. We have already mentioned
VCC § 1-103's express retention of pre-existing obligations theory
except where explicitly pre-empted. This provision thus confirms
the continued general applicability of the Civil Code principles on
error98 of which redhibition is but a specific application.1l9
Moreover, the principle of interpretation for uniformity is
itself subject to interpretation. Does that principle extend to essen-
tially "non-commercial" matters having only minimal effect on
interstate transactions? The early history of the VCC as a proposed
federal statute would indicate a negative response.100 Hence it
94 E.g., Hemenway, Inc. v. Williamson, 173 So. 781 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937).
95 Id. at 783.
96 Ogden v. Rosedale Inn, 189 So. 162 (La. App. Orl. 1939).
97 See 1 S. Williston, Sales § 233a, at 598 (1948).
98 La. Civil Code arts. 1820-46 (1870).
99 Morrow, Warranty of Quality: A Comparative Survey, 14 Tul. L. Rev.
529, 552-56 (1940); compare La. Civil Code art. 1825 (1870) with La. Civil
Code art. 2520 (1870).
100 See Sachse, Report to Louisiana Law Institute on Article Nine of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 41 Tul. L. Rev. 505, 519-21 (1967).
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would not seem illegitimate to continue to apply the error concept
to sales by non-merchants, and within that framework to develop
remedies which will necessarily be very similar to the present
redhibitory action,lOl or to specifically retain the redhibition pro-
visions for non-merchant sales.
(2) Fitness f01' a particula1' PU1'pose, The DCC provides in
section 2-315:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to
know any particular purpose for which the goods are re-
quired and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or
judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless
excluded or modified under the next section an implied war-
ranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
The Louisiana law also extends implied warranty to cover fitness
for particular uses of a buyer, if known to the seller,l°2 but ap- .
parently without the additional requirement that the buyer be
relying on the seller to select suitable goods, Yet the only Louisiana
case that this writer could uncover which involved a successful
claim of breach of warranty for a particular purpose and which
could not have been decided on the basis of an express warranty or
failure of the goods to live up to a general standard of merchant-
ability was a case in which the buyer relied on the seller's deter-
mination of whether the goods would suit her needs.103
c. Disclaimer of warmnty,
Although disclaimer of express warranties is prohibited, section
2-316 takes a more liberal approach toward disclaimers of implied
warranties than under existing jurisprudence.104 A disclaimer may
101 La. Civil Code arts. 1881-82 (1870).
102 E.g., Diamond Music Co. v. Lamazon, 5 La. App. 113 (1926),
103 Stewart v. Scott, 6 La. App. 744 (1927).
104 UCC § 2-316 provides:
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express war-
ranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall
be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but
subject to the provisions of this Article on pal'ol or extrinsic evidence
(Section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that
such construction is unreasonable.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied
warrant of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention
merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to
exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be
by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied war-
ranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are
no wan'anties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied war-
ranties are excluded by expressions like "as is," "with all
faults" or other language which in common understanding calls
the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes
plain that thel'e is no implied warranty; and
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even be implied from conduct or usage of the trade. This would
significantly change present law under which derogations from
implied warranties must be express and explicit and will be strictly
construed.10s
Query whether section 2-316 should be read as limiting the
development of the principle enunciated in Henningsen v. Bloom-
field MOt01'S, Inc.,l°6 that a disclaimer of warranty, at least in a
situation involving inequality of bargaining power and lack of
competition among sellers in respect of warranties offered, might
be declared void as against public policy. One court has found such
a limitation implicit in section 2-316.101 Yet there is dicta in other
opinions which would indicate that a Henningsen type result might
be reached under the Code through the use of the concept of uncon-
scionability.lOs
This latter position is made somewhat suspect by the comment
to section 2-719's provision that limitation of contract remedies for
personal injuries in the sale of consumer goods is prima facie
unconscionable, which states, "The seller in all cases is free to dis-
claim warranties in the manner provided in § 2-316." However,
there is certainly an interpretation of section 2-316 which would
leave section 2-302 in full force. The provisions on disclaimer may
be read merely as indicating the acceptable modes of disclaiming
warranties. Whether a particular disclaimer made in accordance
with section 2-316 is effective depends, not only on compliance with
that section, but also on compliance with any other provision of the
VCC or pre-existing general contract law which bears on the
validity of the contract as a whole or any part of it. On this reading
of section 2-316 the unconscionability concept remains applicable
to disclaimer of warranty, as should pre-existing principles of
public policy like those operative in Henningsen. Moreover, there is
a strong policy argument that some general control over disclaim-
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined
the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has
refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with
regard to defects which an examination ought in the circum-
stances to have revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course
of dealing or course or performance or usage of trade.
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance
with the provisions of this Article on liquidation or limitation of dam-
ages and on contractual modification of remedy (Sections 2-718 and
2-719) .
lOS Meyer v. Mack Mtr. Trucks, Inc., 141 So. 2d 427 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962) .
106 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
101 Mal'shall V. Murray Oldsmobile Co., 4 UCC Rep. 172 (Va. Sup. Ct.
1961).
lOS See Electronics Corp. v. Lear Jet Corp., 4 UCC Rep. 647 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1967); Vlases V. Montgomery Ward & Co., 4 UCC Rep. 164 (3d Cir. 1967).
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ers should be exercised, if, as is possible, the DCC provisions on
warranty are held to supplant the developing doctrine of strict
liability in tort.10ll
d. Persons to whom wa1Tanty extends.
The drafters of the DCC have provided three alternative provi-
sions for section 2-318:
Alternative A
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends
to any natural person who is in the family or household
of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable
to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected
by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the
warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of
this section.
Alternative B
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends
to any natural person who may reasonably be expected to
use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured
in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not ex-
clude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative C
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends
to any person who may reasonably be expected to use, con-
sume or be affected by the goods and who is injured by
breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit
the operation of this section with respect to injury to the
person of an individual to whom the warranty extends.
Alternatives "B" and "C" are variations on the original drafts of
the section before the committee was forced back toward alternative
"A" by manufacturers' hue and cry.
Alternative "A" seems objectionable. Although the Comment
to section 2-318 says that "A" is neutral on the question of the
liability of a manufacturer to the ultimate consumer, the "his
buyer" language certainly seems to speak to that issue. This alter-
native might thus be a step back from the Louisiana jurisprudential
development whereunder (1) the subvendee is subrogated to the
rights of his vendor,l1O and (2) at least the end user of intimate
bodily products has a direct action against the manufacturer with-
out a showing of privity or subrogation.111
lOll See generally Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theory and
Disclaimers in Defective Products Cases, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 974 (1966).
110 See La. Civil Code art. 2503 (1870); McEachen v. Plauche Lbr. Co.,
220 La. 696, 57 So. 2d 405 (1952).
111 Leblanc v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873 (1952).
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Whether Louisiana courts would extend the intimate-bodily-
products rationale to reach the result of alternative "B," or combine
it with the subrogation doctrine to include property damage as
under alternative "C," is an open question. Rather than taking any
of the alternatives or attempting to "codify" the present uncertain
position of the Louisiana jurisprudence, it might be desirable to
leave section 2-318 blank for the time being. The Permanent Re-
vision Committee exhorts us to take the alternative that fits state
law; but none do, and the provision is not "uniform" anyway.
There is some danger in leaving the question to jurisprudential
development. The liberal allowance of disclaimers of warranty
could cause considerable surprise to sub-vendees were the courts
to base future development of warranty liability in "non-privity"
situations on subrogation. Hence, it might be a good idea to attempt
a legislative extension of warranty coverage, that is, alternative
"B" or "C." Presumably a disclaimer of warranty would under
those provisions affect a sub-vendee only if it appeared in his con-
tract in addition to appearing in the contract between his and the
original vendor.
2. Warranty of Title
Section 2-312 provides:
(1) Subject to subsection (2) there is in a contract for
sale a warranty by the seller that
(a) the title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer
rightful; and
(b) the goods shall be delivered free from any security
interest or other lien or encumbrance of which the
buyer at the time of contracting has no knowledge.
(2) A warranty under subsection (1) will be excluded or
modified only by specific language or by circumstances which
give the buyer reason to know that the person selling does
not claim title in himself or that he is purporting to sell only
such right or title as he or a third person may have.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed a seller who is a merchant
regularly dealing in goods of the kind warrants that the
goods shall be delivered free of the rightful claim of any third
person by way of infringement or the like but a buyer who
furnishes specifications to the seller must hold the seller
harmless against any such claim which arises out of com-
pliance with the specifications.
This warranty is not unlike the present Louisiana position.
Although the Civil Code warranty is against "eviction," additional
warranties approaching warranty of title have been developed
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under article 2452.112 The plaintiff need not show perfect outstand-
ing title in another, but only a "just fear" of being disquieted.11s
This is basically the same as the common law rule, that a party
must be "sufficiently exposed to a lawsuit" before he may claim that
his title is not "good,"114 which is continued under the DCCps The
Louisiana position is similarly in accordance with subsection (1) (b)
of section 2-312, that the buyer's warranty action is barred where
he has actual lmowledge of the outstanding claim at the time of
sale.I16
The disclaimer provision of subsection 2 also comports with
existing law, whereunder a disclaimer of warranty may be ex-
pressll7 or result from the type of sale involved, e.g., a quit-claim
deed.11s However an express disclaimer of warranty or circum-
stances amounting to a disclaimer would result in complete freedom
from liability under the DCC, whereas article 2505 of the Civil
Code would require restitution of the price even where warranty
was disclaimed, unless the vendee lmew of the danger of eviction at
the time of the sale and purchased at his risk.
The DCC rule seems preferable. The lack of warranty should be
reflected in the price, and the common sense understanding of the
exclusion of warranties is that the buyer has accepted the risk of a
title defect. The Louisiana jurisprudence had made some movement
in that direction by treating strongly worded non-warranty clauses
as making the sale one at the buyer's "peril and risk." However,
these developments have left the question of what language is
sufficient to shift the risk to the buyer in considerable doubt.119
It should perhaps be noted here that the common law warranty
of "quiet possession" is abolished by section 2-312 as a separate
warranty, although disturbance of possession would certainly go
to establish a warranty of title breach. This creates a problem for
a buyer whose possession is disturbed more than four years from
the date of sale. The warranty of title action will have prescribed120
and there will be no action for warranty of quiet possession to
accrue at the time of disturbance.
This situation presents an additional problem in Louisiana.
Presumably our counterpart of the warranty of quiet possession,
112 See, e.g., Bonvillain v. Bodenheimer, 117 La. 793, 42 So. 273 (1906).
l1S Beckham v. Kelly, 162 La. 421, 110 So. 637 (1926).
114 See, e.g., Hale v. Cochrane, 24 Colo. App. 528, 135 Pac. 980 (1913).
lIS UCC § 2-312, Comment l.
116 Tomlinson v. Thurman, 189 La. 959, 181 So. 458 (1938).
117 La. Civil Code arts. 2503-05 (1870).
11S Waterman v. Tidewater Assoc. Oil Co., 213 La. 588, 35 So. 2d 225 (1947).
119 Compare, e.g., Lyons v. Fitzpatrick, 52 La. Ann. 697, 27 So. 110 (1900)
with Lemoine v. City of Shreveport, 184 La. 221, 165 So. 873 (1936).
120 See UCC § 2-725.
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i.e., the warranty against eviction, will remain on the books to
cover sales of immovables. A cause of action in respect of that
warranty will accrue only upon suit for eviction by a third party,
and any party running afoul of the prescription provisions of the
DCC could be expected to attempt to hold his vendor on the basis
of the Civil Code's provisions. Should the DCC be adopted it seems
clear that he should not be allowed to do so. The elimination of the
"quiet possession" warranty is apparently an attempt to cut off the
vendor's liability and with it the necessity for retaining records
after four years have elapsed from the date of sale.l2l Retention of
the warranty against eviction in Louisiana would be non-uniform
and contrary to the policy of the DCC.
3. Warranty against Infringement
The provision of section 2-312(3) is new to common law states
as well as to Louisiana. Presumably infringement might also result
in failure to give "good" title or make a "rightful" transfer. Note
that this warranty applies only to merchants "regularly dealing in
goods of the kind," that is, persons who can be expected to be knowl-
edgeable enough to be aware of patent or trademark problems in
respect of the goods.
D. Excuse: A return to failu're of cause?
DCC § 2-615 provides:
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater
obligation and subject to the preceding section on substituted
performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part
by a seller who complies with paragraphs (b) and
(c) is not a breach of his duty under a contract for
sale if performance as agreed has been made im-
practicable by the occurrence of a contingency the
non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made or by compliance in
good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic
governmental regulation or order whether or not
it later proves to be invalid.
(b) Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect
only a part of the seller's capacity to perform, he
must allocate production and deliveries among his
customers but may at his option include regular
customers not then under contract as well as his own
requirements for further manufacture. He may so
allocate in any manner which is fair and reasonable.
121 See 1 W. Hawkland, A Transactional Guide to the Uniform Commercial
Code 92-93 (1964).
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(c) The seller must notify the buyer seasonably that
there will be delay or non-delivery and, when alloca-
tion is required under paragraph (b), of the esti-
mated quota thus made available for the buyer.
This section is in effect a provision on failure of cause.122 It is
potentially applicable to any contingency other than casualty to
identified goods123 or problems in respect to an agreed mode of
deliverY,124 which are subject to other specific provisions.
The general tenor of the section, the pre-existing common law
jurisprudence and the comment explanation all suggest that section
2-615 (a) is intended to establish a more liberal position or excuse
than that developed by Louisiana courts under Civil Code article
1933 (2). A survey of the existing jurisprudence leaves little doubt
that Louisiana law is stricter in its requirements for excusable
breach than the French or common law. Moreover, it seems clear
that the applicable general provisions of the Civil Code on failure
of cause, articles 1897-99, have been neglected and that those
provisions suggest a general approach very similar to that embodied
in section 2-615 (a) of the UCC.125
The remaining portions of sections 2-615 and 2-616126 deal
primarily with allocation on partial inability to perform and the
buyer's option to accept or reject the proffered modification of the
contract. There seem to be no guidelines in the Civil Code or the
Louisiana jurisprudence on this problem. The one striking thing
about these provisions is the ability of the seller to pro-rate among
customers to whom he is not at the time under contract. As we
noted in relation to problems of formation, the UCC attempts to
take account of on-going commercial relationships which slip be-
tween the closed categories of pre-existing contract law. Here the
relationship of a supplier to "regular customers" is recognized as
122 See Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 La. L. Rev. 2 (1951).
123 See UCC § 2-613.
124 See discussion supra at text following note 73.
125 See Comment, 21 Tul. L. Rev. 603 (1947).
126 (1) Where the buyer receives notification of a material or indefinite
delay or an allocation justified under the preceding section he may by
written notification to the seller as to any delivery concerned, and where
the prospective deficiency substantially impairs the value of the whole
contract under the provisions of this Article relating to breach of install-
ment contracts (Section 2-612), then also as to the whole,
(a) terminate and thereby discharge any unexecuted portion of the
contract; or
(b) modify the contract by agreeing to take his available quota in
substitution.
(2) If after receipt of such notification from the seller the buyer
fails so to modify the contract within a reasonable time not exceeding
thirty days the contract lapses with respect to any deliveries affected.
(3) The provisions of this section may not be negated by agreement
except in so far as the seller has assumed a greater obligation under the
preceding section.
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tantamount to a contI'actual association as against third parties
who have a right to proportional allocation.
Strangely enough section 2-615 has no counterpart excusing
buyer's performance. As we noted earlier, section 2-614 requires
acceptance of substituted performance in case of governmental
interference with an agreed mode of payment, but it does not say
anything about when such interference would excuse tender of pay-
ment by a substitute method. Section 2-614 does, however, make
clear that payment in accordance with the regulatory measure
causing the difficulty will not discharge the buyer's obligation if the
regulation is "discriminatory, oppressive or predatory."
Presumably, the DCC does not contemplate denying excuse by
failure of presupposed conditions to buyers, although one would
think that appropriate situations for the application of such an
excuse to the buyer's performance would be less frequent than in
the case of sellers. The principal situation is probably failure to
accept goods'under a requirements contract due to "commercial
impracticability." This problem is dealt with in section 2-306.127
If the DCC were adopted in Louisiana a buyer's claim of "com-
mercial impracticability" or failure of cause would raise an inter-
esting methodological problem: Should DCC § 2-615 be applied by
analogy or should pre-existing law on excuse control. Again the
general question of the pre-emptive force of the Commercial Code
arises, but in this context in the form familiar to civilian lawyers
of whether the text is both law and a source of law. The legal liter-
ature is about evenly divided on this issue.128 Without attempting
to take sides in the controversy we might suggest that the problem
is almost certain to be simpler within the confines of specific cases.
In relation to a buyer's defense of failure of cause, for example, a
Louisiana court might by emphasizing Civil Code article 1897
rather than 1933 (2) find that Civil Code and DCC criteria would
be comparable and thus render a choice between them unnecessary.
IV. RISK OF LOSS
Dnder present law the buyer bears the risk of loss from the time
of perfection of a contract for sale.129 This rule is not necessarily
based on a concept of abstract title, yet Louisiana courts have
insisted on analyzing risk of loss cases in terms of the locus of title.
127 See § 2-306, Comment 2 and § 2-615, Comment 9.
128 Compare Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 330 (1951), and Hawkland, Uniform Com-
mercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 Ill. L. Forum 291, 312 with Kripke, The
Principles Underlying the Drafting of the UCC, 1962 Ill. L. Forum 321, 331,
and Paterson, The Codification of Commercial Law in the Light of Jurispru-
dence, 1 N.Y. Rep. 68 (1955).
129 La. Civil Code art. 2467 (1870).
I
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In so doing they have managed to mangle the Uniform Bill of
Lading Act by interpreting a shipment to seller's order as a reserva-
tion of "title" rather than of a security interest, thereby placing the
risk of loss on the seller until receipt of the goods by the buyer.;30
Similarly, the courts have been quick to seize upon almost any
stipulation for inspection as a suspensive condition131 keeping title
and risk of loss in the seller until its fulfillment.132
Both of these approaches seem an understandable attempt to
move away from the very early shifting of risk in the Civil Code.
The buyer is unlikely to have insurance covering goods that are not
in his possession. Moreover, there is the possibility of double
recovery by the seller-from his insurer and from the buyer.l33 But
the courts have gone too far. The retention of the risk of loss in the
seller under a shipper's-order-notifY bill continues risk past com-
pleted performance, and the inspection-as-a-suspensive-condition
cases make too much of the contractual confirmation of the buyer's
normal right to inspect.
The UCC provisions avoid the pitfalls of title by what is com-
monly called the Code's "narrow issue" approach. The question
sought to be answered is not "where is title and therefore risk,"
but only "where is the risk." In the first instance allocation of risks
is contractuaJ.134 If risks are not allocated contractually UCC § 2-509
controls.135
130 E.g., California Fruit Exchange v. Meyer, Inc., 8 La. App. 198 (1927).
131 La. Civil Code arts. 2044, 2457, 2460, 2471 (1870).
132 American Creosote Works v. Boland Mach. Co., 213 La. 834, 35 So. 2d
749 (1948).
133 See McCoid, Allocation of Loss and Property Insurance, 39 Ind. L.J.
647, 649 (1964).
134 UCC § 2-303.
135 (1) Where the contract requires or authorizes the seller to ship
the goods by carrier
(a) if it does not require him to deliver them at a particular destina-
tion, the risk of loss passes to the buyer when the goods are duly
delivered to the carrier even though the shipment is under
reservation (Section 2-505); but
(b) if it does require him to deliver them at a particular destination
and the goods are there duly tendered while in the possession
of the carrier, the risk of loss passes to the buyer when the goods
are there.duly so tendered as to enable the buyer to take delivery.
(2) Where the goods are held by a bailee to be delivered without
being moved, the risk of loss passes to the buyer
(a) on his receipt of a negotiable document of title covering the
goods; or
(b) on acknowledgment by the bailee of the buyer's right to pos-
session of the goods; or
(c) after his receipt of non-negotiable document of title or other
witten direction to deliver, as provided in subsection (4) (b) of
Section 2-503.
(3) In any case not within subsection (1) or (2), the risk of loss
passes to the buyer on his receipt of the goods if the seller is a merchant;
otherwise the risk passes to the buyer on tender of delivery.
(4) The provisions of this section are subject to contrary agreement
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Subsections (1) and (2) of section 2-509 are directed at stan-
dard commercial sale situations and make risk a function of the
seller's completion of his delivery obligations under the contract.
When the seller has completed delivery the buyer is liable for the
price and has the dsk of loss, even though the seller may have
retained a security interest by a shipment under reservation.136
Where no shipment or third party is involved subsection (3)
provides a rule apparently based on the likelihood of one or the
other party's having insurance. Where the seller is a merchant and
therefore likely to carry insurance on his stock he does not shift
the risk to the buyer (who may be an uninsured non-merchant)
until receipt of the goods. Conversely, a non-merchant seller would
shift the risk of loss to a merchant buyer by tender of delivery. In
such situations the Louisiana position would be that risk passes to
the buyer at the perfection of the contract and that the seller's duty
to care for the goods until delivery does not include insuring them
for the buyer's benefit.131 The DCC rules seem clearly preferable.
Where sale is on approval, risk does not pass to the buyer with
acceptance under DCC § 2-327. This is, of course, the true suspen-
sive condition situation, and to that extent the Louisiana position
under articles 2460 and 2471 of the Civil Code would be retained.
DCC § 2-327 also makes the same distinction between suspensive
conditions (sale on approval) and resolutory conditions (sale or
return) that should be made under existing law.13s However, a
simple stipulation for inspection should not under the DCC be read
as importing a suspensive condition affecting risk of loss into the
contract. Risk of loss does not depend on title or on what the courts
derive from other contract terms about the parties' "intentions" on
title passage. Moreover, as was mentioned earlier, the DCC is very
clear in its confirmation of a buyer's right to inspect goods before
acceptance. Therefore, the courts should require a clear indication
of "sale on approval" in order for section 2-327 to come into play.
Should a buyer rightfully reject defective goods or an otherwise
non-conforming tender, the risk of fortuitous loss remains on the
seller until cure or acceptance.139 If the breach is discovered after
of the pa:J;ties and to the provisions of this Article on sale on approval
(Section 2-327) and on effect of breach on risk of loss (Section 2-510).
1,36 UCC § 2-505.
131 Acme Burlap Bag Co. v. Hardin Bag Co., 1 La. App. 379 (1925).
13S La, Civil Code art. 2471 (1870).
139 (1) Where a tender or delivery of goods so fails to conform to the
contract as to give a right of rejection the risk of their loss remains on
the seller until cure or acceptance.
UCC § 2-510 (1).
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acceptance, or in situations involving buyer's breach before delivery,
the injured party may under the DCC treat the risk as on the
breaching party to the extent of any deficiency in his insurance.140
Comparison of these provisions ,vith the effect of breach on
risk of loss under present law is difficult because there is in Louisi-
ana no well delineated concept of buyer's right of rejection. The
Civil Code seems to presume that a defect in quality should always
give rise to a redhibitory action and shifts the risk back to the
seller only from the time of suit.141 But the buyer may simply refuse
to accept the goods because defective. Should this be considered
tantamount to a failure by the seller to "deliver," other articles of
the Code might allow the buyer to shift the risk back to the seller by
a complaint in writing sufficient to put the seller in default.142 At any
rate the provisions of DCC § 2-510 which make allocation of risk
depend on a deficiency in effective insurance work a change-a
change with the beneficial result of protecting innocent parties
while precluding possibilities of double recovery by them.
Special provisions for allocation of risk in sales subject to a
suspensive condition,143 sale by weight, tale or measure,144 situations
where delivery is delayed,145 or in alternative sales146 are not neces-
sary under the DCC scheme because risk does not pass to the buyer
until delivery anyway.
V. REMEDIES
The remedies sections of article 2 seem the most confused and
confusing in the DCC. A part of the problem stems from the inter-
related and cumulative nature of the remedies provided.147 Another
difficulty involves simply getting at the meaning of individual
sections-the seller's right to "cancel," for example.
140 (2) Where the buyer rightfully revokes acceptance he may to the
extent of any deficiency in his effective insurance coverage treat the risk
of loss as having rested on the seller from the beginning.
(3) Where the buyer as to conforming goods already identified to
the contract for sale repudiates or is otherwise in breach before risk of
their loss has passed to him, the seller may to the extent of any deficiency
in his effective insurance coverage treat the risk of loss as resting on the
buyer for a commercially reasonable time.
UCC § 2-510 (2-3).
141 La. Civil Code art. 2533 (1870). (Destruction due to a defect in the
goods is always at seller's risk. La. Civil Code art. 2532 (1870».
142 See La. Civil Code arts. 1910-12, 1933 (4), 2219, 2470 (1870).
143 La. Civil Code art. 2471 (1870). Compare UCC § 2-613.
144 La. Civil Code art. 2458 (1870).
145 La. Civil Code art. 2470 (1870).
146 La. Civil Code arts. 2472-73 (1870).
147 See generally the "roadmap" provided by Peters, Remedies for Breach
of Contract, 73 Yale L.J. 199 (1963).
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A. Cancellation
As one of his remedies section 2-703 provides that "the ag-
grieved seller may ••• cancel." A Louisiana lawyer will quickly
apprehend what this must imply, a suit for dissolution148 whereby
the seller retrieves the goods and collects damages. Not so, or at
least apparently not so.
Section 2-106 (4) provides:
(4) "Cancellation" occurs when either party puts an end
to the contract for breach by the other and its effect is the
same as that of "termination" except that the cancelling
party also retains any remedy for breach of the whole con-
tract or any unperformed balance.
This language indicates that cancelling a contract is not really a
remedy at all but a means for categorizing or declaring an existing
situation.149 Such a declaration has no effect on the availability of
other remedies150 and we must pursue these other remedies in order
to determine the effect of "cancellation."
There is little doubt that the default which gives rise to cancella-
tion will allow a suit for damages.l5l The tricky problem is whether
the seller may also, as in judicial dissolution in Louisiana, repossess
the goods.
-
At common law, "rescission" or "cancellation" after delivery
gives no right to specific restitution save in exceptional cases of
unique objects. The normal recovery is in quasi-contract for the
value of the performance rendered.152 There are strong indications
that this position was meant to continue under the DCC. The only
provision in the DCC for reclamation in a credit sale is concerned
with recovery from an insolvent buyer. Section 2-702:
(2) Where the seller discovers that the buyer has re-
ceived goods on credit while insolvent he may reclaim the
goods upon demand made within ten days after the receipt,
but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the
particular seller in writing within three months before de-
livery the ten day limitation does not apply. Except as pro-
vided in this subsection the seller may not base a right to
reclaim goods on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent mis-
representation of solvency or of intent to pay.
(3) The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is
subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other
good faith purchaser [or lien creditor] under this Article
148 La. Civil Code arts. 2046, 2561 (1870).
149 But cf., UCC § 1-106 (2) •
150 UCC § 2-720.
151 UCC § 2-708.
152 3 S. Williston, Sales § 593 (Rev. ed. 1948).
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(Section 2-403). Successful reclamation of goods excludes
all other remedies with respect to them.
The last sentence of this provision, excluding all other remedies
where reclamation is effective, casts doubt on an interpretation of
the right to cancel under the UCC which would give restitution plus
damages as a normal remedy. Of course insolvency could be a
special case where remedies are restricted, but this hardly seems a
plausible reading given the common-law background against which
these provisions were drafted. Section 2-702 (2) and (3) actually
strengthen the seller's right to reclaim specific goods under the pre-
existing common law and Uniform Sales Act.l53 The clear implica-
tion is that specific restitution is a special remedy under section
2-702 and not one generally flowing from "cancellation."
Moreover, the remedy is not very useful. The reclaiming cred-
itor's rights are subordinated to good faith purchasers or lien credi-
tors. Subordination to the latter class of persons has been removed
in the latest formulation of section 2-702,164 but even so the right
of reclamation remains weak.lI>5
To the extent that there is a general right to reclaim specific
goods in the UCC, it would have to be found as an incident to
cancellation of a cash sale under the conditions specified in section
2-507(2) :
(2) Where payment is due and demanded on the delivery
to the buyer of goods or documents of title, his right as
against the seller to retain or dispose of them is conditional
upon his making the payment due.
Even here no specific right of reclamation is given, and there is
no clear agreement on whether one is implied.156 At least one case
has assumed that specific restitution could be had under section
2-507 (2).151 But that case also illustrates the weakness of the
remedy under the UCC in relation to third parties.
On balance, one should conclude that "cancel" in section 2-703
bears little or no relation to "dissolve" or "resolve" as understood
in the Louisiana law of remedies. It seems certain that it will not
be read in that light in other jurisdictions. Hence in adopting the
UCC, "dissolution" as it is understood under the "Sales" articles
of the Civil Code should be suppressed. This would involve only
the elimination of articles 2564 and 3229-31. Other articles dealing
153 1 N.Y. Rep. 214 (1955).
154 Report No.3 of the Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC 3 (1967).
155 Sachse, supra note 100, at 822.
156 Compare, 1 Hawkland, supra note 121, at 299, with 1 N.Y. Rep. 148 and
Peters, supra note 147, at 218.
157 See Evans Prod. v. Jargensen, 421 P.2d 978 (Ore. Sup. Ct. 1966).
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with dissolution apply equally to sales of immovables and hence
could remain in force. Indeed, if the reported appellate cases are a
significant indication, it is in regard to immovables that the right
to "revendicate" presently finds its almost exclusive utility.
The effect of the loss of the :right of rescission on Louisiana
vendors should be weighed primarily in terms of its function as
it security device, for it adds nothing to a seller's measure of
recovery. In this writer's opinion the elimination of revendication
as a general remedy in the sale of goods will be, if anything, salu-
tary. Either the right to revendicate gives the same security as a
vendor's privilege, in which case it is otiose, or it gives a greater
right, in which case it seems unduly preferential and adds con-
fusion to the priority of security interests under Louisiana law.158
B, Seller's action fO'1" price or resale
Of course all is not chaos in the remedies sections and some
improvements in existing law are to be expected. One such area
is that of the seller's choice between a suit £01' the price or resale
followed by an action for damages.
The favored seller's remedy under the DCC is resale. An action
for the price is allowable only under the conditions specified in
section 2-709:
(1) When the buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes
due the seller may recover, together with any incidental
damages under the next section, the price
(a) of goods accepted or of conforming goods lost or
damages within a commercially reasonable time
after risk of their loss has passed to the buyer; and
(b) of goods identified to the contract if the seller is un-
able after l<easonable effort to resell them at a
reasonable price or the circumstances reasonably
indicate that such effort will be unavailing.
(2) Where the seller sues for the price he must hold for
the buyer any goods which have been identified to the con-
158 See generally Yiannopoulos, supra note 27, at 323-27. The position of the
revendicatory action under the Federal Bankruptcy Act is far from clear. It
could be treated as adding nothing to an unsecured party's rights, as a special
"sales law" right which is unaffected by even the hypothetical lien creditor or
bona fide purchaser, or as in essence a statutory lien. The latter seems the
most sensible approach, which would mean that revendication would be a
right of the same magnitude as the vendor's privilege. Under amended section
67 (c) (1) (B) this is a dubious distinction. Moreover, the same analysis could
be made in respect of uee § 2-702's right of reclamation and stoppage in
transit under section 2-705. Hence, the amendments to section 2-702 based on
In Re Kravitz (see Sachse, supra note 100) may not have really gotten at the
heart of the bankruptcy-reclamation problem-but this is a topic for a separate
article.
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tract and are still in his control except that if resale becomes
possible he may resell them at any time prior to the collection
of the judgment. The net proceeds of any such resale must
be credited to the buyer and payment of the judgment
entitles him to any goods not resold.
(3) After the buyer has wrongfully rejected or revoked
acceptance of the goods or has failed to make a payment due
or has repudiated (Section 2-610), a seller who is held not
entitled to the price under this section shall nevertheless be
awarded damages for non-acceptance under the preceding
section.
This provision probably changes the present Louisiana law.
Although resale is not provided in the Civil Code, it was adopted
by the jurisprudence at an early stage and has in some cases been
suggested as the sole remedy in preference to an action for the
price.11i9 However, the better view seems to be that the seller has
alternative remedies where the buyer breaches before delivery. He
can resell and claim damages or tender and hold the goods for the
buyer while suing for the price. The only restriction on this choice
is the mitigation of damages rule, which would require resale of
perishables and of other goods in a falling market.16o Yet we can only
say that the Louisiana rule is "probably" changed because (1) the
"seller's option" analysis is not clearly preponderant and (2) the
mitigation rule might logically encompass a duty to sell wherever
commercially reasonable in order to terminate the risk of price
fluctuations.161
1. Goods in 'respect of which the 1'emedies are available; salvage
It will be noted that section 2-709 (1) (b) speaks in terms of
goods "identified to the contract." The concept of "identification" is
explained in section 2-501:
(1) The buyer obtains a special property and an insur-
able interest in goods by identification of existing goods as
goods to which the contract refers even though the goods
so identified are non-conforming and he has an option to
return or reject them. Such identification can be made at
any time and in any manner explicitly agreed to by the
parties. In the absence of explicit agreement identification
occurs
(a) when the contract is made if it is for the sale of
goods already existing and identified;
(b) if the contract is for the sale of future goods other
159 See generally Comment, 4 Tu!. L. Rev. 92 (1929).
160 Leon Godchaux Clothing Co. v. DeBuys, 10 La. App. 635, 120 So. 539
(1929).
161 See Mutual Rice Co. v. Star Bottling Works, 163 La. 159, 111 So. 661
(1927).
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than those described in paragraph (c), when goods
are shipped, marked or otherwise designated by the
seller as goods to which the contract refers;
(c) when the crops are planted or otherwise become
growing crops or the young are conceived if the con-
tract is for the sale of unborn young to be born
within twelve months after contracting or for the
sale of crops to be harvested within twelve months
or the next normal harvest season after contracting
whichever is longer.
Actually, questions of identification to the contract are given
little influence elsewhere in the DCC. The presence or absence of
identification does not, for example, have any effect on the shifting
of the risk of loss. The concept is not therefore akin to "appropria-
tion" under article 2458 of the Civil Code. Nor are remedies really
affected. Although sections 2-709 and 2-706 on resale seem to give
some efficacy to identification as a prerequisite to suit, this is
contradicted by section 2-704 which provides for the accomplish-
ment of such identification after breach:
(1) An aggrieved seller under the preceding section may
(a) identify to the contract conforming goods not al-
ready identified if at the time he learned of the
breach they. are in his possession or control;
(b) treat as the subject of resale goods which have
demonstrably been intended for the particular con-
tract even though those goods are unfinished.
(2) Where the goods are unfinished an aggrieved seller
may in the exercise of reasonable commercial judgment for
the purposes of avoiding loss and of effective realization
either complete the manufacture and wholly identify the
goods to the contract or cease manufacture and resell for
scrap or salvage value or proceed in any other reasonable
manner.
Although nothing in the Louisiana jurisprudence is quite so
explicit as section 2-704 concerning the option to salvage or com-
plete manufacture, this provision would probably make no change
in present practice. An aggrieved seller is bound to do whatever is
reasonable to minimize damages and no more than is reasonable.162
2. Price
Aside from its possibly more limited application, the action for
the price seems to conform to the present Louisiana model. In addi-
162 See, e.g., Carrol v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 52 So. 2d 258 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1951) ; ct. Dairy Spec. Inc. v. Verbene, 117 So. 2d 632 (La. App. OrL
1960) (inability to resell as salvage excused subtraction of salvage value
from damages).
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tion to the price the seller may collect incidental damages under
section 2-710:
Incidental damages to an aggrieved seller include any
commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions
incurred in stopping delivery, in the transportation, care and
custody of goods after the buyer's breach, in connection with
return or resale of the goods or otherwise resulting from the
breach.
Presumably the same result would obtain under Louisiana Civil
Code articles 1930 and 2555.163
"Incidental expense" under UCC § 2-710 is, of course, an expan-
sive concept. One case, Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Lawrence
Amer. Field Whse. Corp.,l64 has suggested that damages recover-
able under section 2-710 includes legal expenses. However, the
statement is pure dictum. Since legal expenses and innumerable
other out-of-pocket expenses are not specified in section 2-710, it
is apparently up to each jurisdiction to develop its own concept of
"incidental," keeping in mind the desirability of uniformity.
Although section 2-709 (2) requires only that the seller "hold"
goods for the buyer, he will, in accordance with the present Lou-
isiana precondition to a suit for the price, have already tendered.
Otherwise, the buyer will be under no obligation to pay.16S The
ability to resell after judgment is new, but it is not contrary to any
previous holding.
3. Resale
The general right of resale is provided in section 2-706 (1) :
(1) Under the conditions stated in Section 2-703 on
seller's remedies, the seller may resell the goods concerned or
the undelivered balance thereof. Where the resale is made in
good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner the
seller may recover the difference between the resale price
and the contract price together with any incidental damages
allowed under the provisions of this Article (Section 2-710),
but less expenses saved in consequence of the buyer's breach.
This provision changes the rule but not the practice under
existing law in relation to the determination of damages. The rule
has always been that the measure of damages was the contract
price less the market price at the time for delivery, but in practice
the resale price is considered to establish the market price if carried
163 But see La. Civil Code arts. 1934-35 (1870).
164 16 N.Y.2d 344, 213 N.E.2d 873 (1965).
165 UCC § 2-507 (1).
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out in a l'easonable manner.1l16 Under the uee market price is
relevant only in determining the reasonableness of the resale.
Section 2-706 (1) appears to limit the seller's recovery where he
has resold to the difference between contract and resale price plus
incidental damages, This would mean that the uec was consistent
with the Mossy Motors v. McRedrnond167 approach, that is, that
anticipated profits from loss of "a sale" are not recoverable. How-
ever, such is not the case. The measure of damages under section
2-706 (1) is not mandatory. The seller may instead employ section
2-708 in order to put himself in as good a position as if the buyer
had performed.
Section 2-708:
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and to the provisions of
this Article with respect to proof of market price (Section
2-723), the measure of damages for non-acceptance or re-
pudiation by the buyer is the difference between the market
price at the time and place for tender and the unpaid con-
tract price together with any incidental damages provided in
this Article (Section 2-710), but less expenses saved in con-
sequence of the buyer's breach.
(2) If the measure of damages provided in subsection
(1) is inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as
performance would have done then the measure of damages
is the profit (including reasonable overhead) which the
seller would have made from full performance by the buyer,
together with any incidental damages provided in this Ar-
ticle (Section 2-710), due allowance for costs reasonably
incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale.
These alternative provisions have two consequences in the case of
resale:
First, the Mossy Motors approach is rejected by section 2-708
as it should be. The ultimate conclusions to be drawn from Mossy
are either that there is no right of resale in Louisiana or that the
seller should always sue for specific performance in order to pro-
tect his profit. Both results are commercially unacceptable, for
they have the effect of tying up goods for the benefit of buyers who
do not want them. The alternative to specific performance under
present law, barring resale, is to sue for rescission with damages
and then resell, which, of course, also preserves the right to the
profit on both sales. There, thus, seems no reason why the resale
remedy should not be rationalized in order to provide the same
benefit through a less cumbersome procedure.
166 See, e.g., E. & W. F. Peck, Ltd. v. Southwestern Lbr. Co., 131 La. 177,
59 So. 113 (1912).
167 12 So. 2d 719 (La. App. Orl. 1943).
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Second, the option to use "market" instead of resale price under
section 2-708 (1) gives the seller the benefit of a resale made at
above a provable market price. If the seller can pull this off, he
certainly should get the benefit. However, the seller does not re-
ceive all the benefits of an above-market resale. If he seeks to recover
lost profits under section 2-708 (2) he will apparently have to
account for these proceeds. This seems inconsistent with the policy
of section 2-708 (1). The same result would occur where the seller
resold for not only more than the market, but for more than the
contract price. Although section 2-706(6) specifically states that
the seller is not accountable for profits on the resale (by "profits"
presumably is meant excess over contract price), a claim for "prof-
its" under section 2-708 would in all cases be offset by the "pro-
ceeds" of the resale. The benefits of section 2-706(6) and section
2-708 (1) are thus limited to cases where lost profits are not re-
covered under section 2-708 (2).
The above analysis is not supported by any reported cases, but
it seems the only means of rationalizing section 2-706 with section
2-708. The alternative is to consider section 2-708 damages in-
applicable where there is a resale. This possibility is negated both
by the language of section 2-708 (2) and by the illogicality of
allowing a greater measure of damages where goods are retained
until after suit than where they are promptly resold.
The provision of section 2-706(6) whereby the vendor retains
the excess, if any, over the contract price on resale is contrary to
present law, if Mossy Motors is representative; but it probably
accords with the Louisiana position under older cases which treat
resale as for the vendor's account.16B Moreover, the positions of
sections 2-706 (6) and 2-708 (1) are supported by the logic of
Friedman Iron & Supply Co. v. J. B. Beai1'd CO.169 The vendor there
was allowed to measure damages as the difference between contract
and market prices at the time of the breach, although he had re-
tained the goods and could at the time of suit have sold them at
above the contract price. Assuming that he did so immediately after
judgment, it is obvious that he was allowed to retain "profit" in the
section 2-706 (6) sense and an excess above market as under sec-
tion 2-708 (1).
C. The preference for cover
We might note in passing that the DCC's preference for sub-
stitutional redress is carried forward in relation to buyer's rem-
edies. Like the Louisiana jurisprudence, the DCC views specific
168 H. T. Cottam & Co. v. Moises, 149 La. 305, 88 So. 916 (1921).
169 222 La. 627, 63 So. 2d 144 (1953).
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performance as exceptiona1.110 However, the DCC would force the
making of a substitute contract, that is, "cover," where the Louisi-
ana jurisprudence seemingly would not.
DCC § 2-715 (2) (a) limits buyer's consequential damages to
"any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and
needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to
lmow and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or
otherwise." Although Louisiana has a standard mitigation of dam-
ages rule, it has not been applied to limit recovery of "profits"
where cover might have been possible and damages therefore mea-
sured by the difference between contract and market prices.111
Louisiana courts have not allowed the double recovery of expenses
of cover plus lost profits; they have merely solved the cumulation
problem in favor of recovery of profits. The DCC reverses this
preference.
D. Remedies for breach of warranty of quality
1. Mechanics of buyer's "recission" or "'revocation of accep-
tance."
One often hears that a basic difference between common law
and civil law approaches to dissolution of contracts lies in the
distinction between judicial (civillaw) and extra-judicial (common
law) procedures. Certainly the bare statement of existing principles
under the Louisiana Civil Code and the DCC would lead to this
conclusion. Article 2047 of the Civil Code provides:
In all cases the dissolution of a contract may be de-
manded by suit or by exception; and when the resolutory
condition is an event, not depending on the will of either
party, the contract is dissolved of right; but, in other cases,
it must be sued for, and the party in default may, according
to circumstances, have a further time allowed for the per-
formance of the condition.
Whereas under DCC § 2-608:
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or
commercial unit whose non-conformity substantially impairs
its value to him if he has accepted it
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its non-confor-
mity would be cured and it has not been seasonably
cured; or
110 See UCC § 2-716(1}. The one modern Louisiana case giving specific
performance in a contract for the sale of movables was decided in federal court,
Gray v. Premier Inv. Co., 51 F. Supp. 944 (w.n. La. 1943), and would cer-
tainly have been decided the same way under the UCC.
111 See, e.g., Usrey Lbr. Co. v. Huie-Hodge Lbr. Co., 146 La. 296, 83 So.
578 (1920); E. B. Williams & Co. v. Bienvenue, 109 La. 1023, 34 So. 63 (1903).
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(b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his
acceptance was reasonably induced either by the
difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the
seller's assurances.
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a rea-
sonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discov-
ered the ground for it and before any substantial change in
condition of the goods which is not caused by their own
defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller
of it.
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and
duties with regard to the goods involved as if he had rejected
them.
The most frequent application of these procedures is doubtless
in relation to breach of implied warranty of quality. Strangely
enough, in most cases, the distinctions between these provisions
will yield no differences in result. The Louisiana buyer who has
not paid the price will normally tender back the goods, and if the
seller accepts them the sale is dissolved. Should the seller deny the
existence of defects, he will then have to sue for the price, and the
buyer will defend on the basis of redhibitory vice. The same prac-
tice may be expected under the UCC. Although UCC § 2-717 ex-
pressly authorizes deduction of unliquidated claims from the pur-
chase price, this really changes nothing, for the buyer may always
withhold payment and risk suit by the seller.
Apparent differences arise in a situation where the buyer has
made part or full payment. Under the Civil Code we would expect
the buyer to sue in redhibition for return of the payments, whereas
under UCC § 2-608 (3) the buyer is given the same rights as if he
had "rejected" the goods, including resale in order to realize his
"security interest" in the goods. In fact the same procedure can be
used under existing law. Inability to return the goods prevents an
action in redhibition, but not an action in quanti minoris.172 Hence
a complaining buyer may resell and then either defend or sue on
the basis of quanti minoris with due allowance for the extent of his
recovery on the resale.
A more meaningful effect of requiring judicial dissolution is
the opportunity for the court to prescribe curative remedies, such
as reduction of the price173 or additional time for performance.174
In the UCC these devices are provided under the cure concept of
section 2-508, and presumably the buyer's failures to allow appro-
priate curative action would make his revocation wrongful. A court
172 Ehrlich v. Roby Mtrs. Co., 166 La. 557, 139 So. 686 (1928).
173 La. Civil Code art. 2543 (1870).
17-i La. Civil Code art. 2047 (1870).
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should then, make any warranty action or defense on the part of
the buyer conditional on allowing the seller to cure or to attempt to
cure the defects or to make money allowance for uncured items.175
Section 2-608 operates in other respects much as the Louisiana
action in redhibition. Apparent defects are excluded as grounds
to substantiate breach,176 but seller's assurances not rising to the
level of express warranties might excuse close inspection.177 The
standard for determining breach is also very similar, although
arguably the DCC language, "substantially impairs its value to
him," establishes a subjective standard as compared with the
seemingly objective criterion of article 2520 of the Civil Code, "so
inconvenient and imperfect, that it must be supposed that the buyer
would not have purchased it, had he known of the vice." The real
issue here is whether it is necessary that the seller know, actually
or constructively, of the intended use or of other factors affecting
the "value" of a particular item to the buyer.178 The comment to
section 2-608 indicates that this is not necessary under the DCC,
but that statement is difficult to square with the distinction in DCC
§§ 2-314 and 2-315 between warranties of merchantability and of
fitness for a particular purpose. It is at least doubtful that any
change in existing practice would result.
The DCC approach to delay in effecting a dissolution for breach
of warranty diverges from the present LQuisiana position. Appar-
ently the Louisiana vendee need only sue within one year from the
date of the sale.179 Although breach of implied warranty of quality
is a "pqssive" breach,180 the Civil Code seems to presume that "put-
ting ill default" is not necessary. Article 1~12 of the Civil Code
makes putting in default a prerequisite to suit "in the cases herein-
after provided for." The redhibition articles are silent on default,
and given the effects of formal default this is understandable. "Put-
ting in default" normally affects the right to damages and the
shifting of risk of 10ss,181 but the redhibitory action precludes
damages182 and risk can be shifted back to the vendor only by
175 See Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967). One
Louisiana court has recently taken a very restrictive view of the ability of a
seller to cure performance--a view which seems unnecessary under the codal
provision, although perhaps warranted on the facts of the particular case.
Cain v. Rapides Dodge Inc., 207 So.2d 918, 920-21 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1968).
176 Compare UCC § 2-316(3) (b), 'U/ith La. Civil Code art. 2521 (1870).
177 Compare UCC § 2-608(1) (b), with Melancon v. Robichaux, 17 La. 97,
101 (1841).
178 See La. Civil Code art, 1826 (1870).
179 La. Civil Code art. 2534 (1870).
180 See La. Civil Code art. 1931 (1870).
181 La. Civil Code art. 1912 (1870).
182 La. Civil Code art. 2531 (1870). (Of course damages are recoverable
where the vendor is in bad faith, but this would seem an "active" breach not
requiring formal default.)
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suit.183 However, there are some essentially "estoppel" cases which
deny the buyer's right to recover for defects or to use a defect de-
fensively where an inordinately long time has elapsed between
discovery and notice of the defect or where the seller's opportunity
to reduce his loss has been prejudiced.184
DCC § 2-608 (2), on the other hand, requires that "revocation
of acceptance" be made within a "reasonable time" after discovery
of the defects. Apparently "unreasonableness" does not require
proof of estoppel, but beyond this observation it is difficult to appre-
hend in the abstract what factors might be determinative on the
question of reasonableness of the time of revocation. However, in
addition to exercising section 2-608 rights within a reasonable time,
the buyer will also have to have given notice of the breach in accor-
dance with DCC § 2-607 (3) (a) which provides:
(3) Where a tender has been accepted
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he
discovers or should have discovered any breach
notify the seller of breach or be barred from any
remedy ....
Mter giving such notice the buyer may attempt to obtain curative
action by the seller without forfeiting his right to revoke accep-
tance,185 but should he delay unduly long in exercising this right
he will yet have an action in damages which prescribes in four
years.18G
Thus, where rescission and restitution are involved the DCC
seems to agree with Civil Code's policy of a short prescriptive
period without going to the extreme of cutting off the warranty
action in damages at the same time.
2. Damages
To speak of damages for breach of warranty is normally in-
appropriate in Louisiana. Redhibitory defects give rise to rescis-
sion with return of the full price or an action in quanti minoris for
diminution of the price. In the former case there may be an award
of "expenses occasioned by the sale" which could perhaps properly
be considered incidental damages. But the idea of awarding dam-
ages qua damages applies only in the case of bad faith or fraud.187
Quite simply put, a suit in redhibition is not a suit for breach of
183 La. Civil Code art. 2533 (1870).
184 See American Law Book Co. v. Jones, 9 La. App. 280 (1928); Interstate
Elec. Co. v. Adamant Porcelain Co., 7 La. App. 577 (1928).
185 UCC § 2-608, Comment 4.
186 UCC § 2-725.
187 La. Civil Code arts. 2545-47 (1870).
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promise, whereas under the DCC "breach of warranty" and "breach
of contract" make available the same remedies.188
Article 2531 of the Civil Code provides the measure of recovery
in redhibition:
The seller who knew not the vices of the thing, is only
bound to restore the price, and to reimburse the expenses
occasioned by the sale, as well as those incurred for the
preservation of the thing, unless the fruits, which the pur-
chaser has drawn from it, be sufficient to satisfy those ex-
penses.
Without going into any extended discussion of what may be
awarded by way of buyer's consequential damages under the DCC
or of what "expenses occasioned by the sale" includes in Louisiana,
it is obvious that the former includes satisfaction of expectancy
interests and that the latter does not. It is suggested that the DCC
rule is preferable.
The Louisiana provision has been explained in terms of the
underlying theory of the French and Louisiana Codes that a failure
of the goods to live up to their supposed quality is comparable to
error as to their substance. Therefore, the remedial provisions are
designed to put the parties back in the status quo ante. Moreover,
since the vendor has made no actual or implied-in-fact promise he
should not be held for breach of promise damages. The equation
with vices of consent is carried further by making a vendor who
knew of the defects liable as in fraud.189
This system is logical but it is not necessarily desirable. There
is really no good reason for allowing breach of contract remedies
where warranties are implied in fact and denying them when im-
plied in law. In either case an express promise is lacking and often
in a concrete instance the distinction is subject to manipulation. No
one would suggest that other implied-in-Iaw terms, for example,
the reciprocal obligations of delivery and removal, should be sub-
ject to breach without incurring ordinary breach of contract dam-
ages. It is perhaps for this reason that the French courts have gone
very far in allowing ordinary breach of contract damages against
good faith vendors under the rubric of "expenses occasioned by
the sale."190
Of course, as we noted earlier, the Louisiana action in redhibi-
tion covers both express and implied warranties and hence part of
the logic of the French system is inapplicable here. For some ob-
188 UCC §§ 2-714 and 2-715.
189 Morrow, Warranty of Quality: A Comparative Survey, 14 Tul. L. Rev.
529, 552-56 (1940).
190 Cf., id. at 539-43.
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scure reason the drafters of the Louisiana Civil Code provided that
not even a breach of promise is a breach of promise, if the promise
was made in good faith. In other terms, standard breach of contract
damages are never awardable under the Louisiana scheme where
the contract contains an express warranty. If the promisor is in
good faith, the redhibition measure of damages is applicable; if he
is in bad faith recovery is as in fraud, which, includes "unforesee-
able" consequential damage.101
Indeed it is possible that the good faith/bad faith distinction
goes further to eliminate the normal breach of contract recovery of
"foreseeable" damage in all cases of breach of warranty in Louisi-
ana. Article 2545 says that a seller who knows of the vice and
fails to declare it is answerable in "damages." The question then
is how to measure the damage under article 1934, by the good faith
or the bad faith standard? There is of course a distinction between
the "bad faith" which gives rise to damages for breach of warranty
under article 2545 and "bad faith" as used in article 1934. Article
2545 is concerned with bad faith at the time of formation, while
1934 relates to bad faith breach.192 Yet the party who knows of a
vice at formation must also know of it at performance, and we
should not~ here that a manufacturer is held to have constructive
knowledge of defects for purposes of article 2545.
Of course there is a good argument to be made that "knowledge"
of a defect and certainly "constructive" knowledge thereof is not
sufficient to put a party in "bad faith" under article 1934. What
little case authority there is on point, Doyle 'IJ. Fuerst & K'ramer,1fJ3
presumes that only foreseeable damages are recoverable, but there
is some doubt concerning its vitality. The decision is based in part
on negligence principles and in part on French commentary which
is inappropriate. The French Civil Code gives all causally connected
damages only for fraudulent breach, not for bad faith breach.104
Were the DCC adopted, section 2-715 would simply strike the
middle ground by providing normal breach of contract damages,
including expectation interests, in the ordinary breach of warranty
situation, while a "true" fraud remedy could remain under section
2-721 and the existing Louisiana Code provisions. The use of con-
structive knowledge under Civil Code article 2545 in order to cir-
cumvent the limited recovery in redhibition in "products liability"
cases would no longer be necessary because personal injury and
101 La. Civil Code arts. 2547, 1934 (2) (1870).
102 See Christie & Low v. Pennsylvania Iron Wks. Co., 128 La. 208, 54 So.
742 (1911).
103 8 Orl. App. 408 (1911).
104 French Civil Code art. 1150.
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property damage are explicitly made recoverable by section 2-715
(2) (b).
VI. CONCLUSION
This discussion has hit only a few high points, and it should
certainly not be thought to have covered even all the major areas
of sales law which would be affected by adoption of Article Two of
the DCC. Moreover, it has had little or nothing to say about the
desirability of adopting Article Two. On that question this writer
has been unable to anive at a firm conclusion.
There are, of course, advantages and disadvantages. The DCC's
general approach to sales problems-the attempt to provide a
"commercially reasonable" set of standards-seems a move in the
right direction. The provisions we have discussed on contract for-
mation, on cure, on security of expectations, on warranty and in a
number of other areas carry through on this basic theme. However,
this attempt to get away from lawyer's law toward merchant's law
was not made systematically. The Code sections are not based on
field study but on the accumulated experience of the drafters and
on problems as they appear in reported appellate cases. Hence it
is not really possible to know whether the DCC solves the present
commercial sale problems of this or any other jurisdiction. Yet,
certainly the Sales al'ticle of the DCC solves many specific problems
under prior jurisprudence by breaking issues down into functional
categories-what Professor Llewellyn called "narrow-issue think-
ing." But in so doing the Commercial Code loses much of the sys-
tematic clarity to which we are accustomed in our private law of
obligations.
There are many other arguments pro and con.195 On perhaps the
most significant question we have no data: What would be the effect
on the economic posture of this state were it to remain non-con-
formist in the area of commercial sales law'! Should the effect be
felt to be significant, that consideration is very likely to override
all others. We could after all rejoin the union and give everyone
the benefit of our civilian training in the continuing process of
revision and redrafting.
195 See discussion in Sachse, supra note 100, at 845-46.
